Road Accident Fund v Newnet Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Sunshine Hospital and Another

The Road Accident Fund (RAF) applied to the High Court to suspend writs of execution based on 181 court orders obtained by Newnet Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Sunshine Hospital (Sunshine), a private hospital treating motor vehicle accident victims. The orders related to payment for medical services under s 17(5) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. In 2007, the RAF and Sunshine concluded a cooperation agreement whereby Sunshine provided office space for RAF employees to assist with processing claims. A practice evolved where Sunshine submitted "combined" or "global" claims that included charges for Sunshine's hospital services, doctors, and other service providers treating the same patient. This practice was initiated at the RAF's request to avoid duplication of documentation. The RAF paid these combined claims for approximately 15 years. From April 2020, the RAF ceased payments, alleging the combined claims violated the RAF Act and health profession regulations. The RAF alleged that: (a) each service provider must submit separate claims; (b) medical practitioners acted unethically by billing through Sunshine; (c) there was patient touting and over-servicing; and (d) there were perverse referral arrangements. The RAF instituted investigations through its Forensic Investigation Department (FID), Universal Healthcare, and Sizwe Ntsaluba Global Grant Thornton (SNG), and lodged complaints with the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and the Special Investigation Unit (SIU). When Sunshine sought to execute on the 181 unpaid court orders, the RAF applied under rule 45A of the Uniform Rules to stay the sale in execution pending a declarator application that it was not liable for combined claims.

• Whether rule 45A of the Uniform Rules permitted the suspension of writs of execution based on 181 valid, uncontested court orders
• Whether combined or global claims submitted by Sunshine on behalf of multiple service providers contravened s 17(5) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
• Whether medical practitioners submitting invoices through Sunshine acted unethically or in breach of the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 and related ethical guidelines
• Whether the High Court's refusal of leave to appeal should be reconsidered under s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
• Whether the application for reconsideration had become moot after the sale in execution had already taken place
• Whether the RAF should be granted leave to adduce new evidence on appeal

1. The application to adduce new evidence on appeal is dismissed. 2. The application for the reconsideration of the decision refusing leave to appeal in terms of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 is dismissed. 3. In both instances, the applicant shall pay the first respondent's costs, including the costs of two counsel.

1. Section 17(5) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 does not prescribe the manner in which claims for medical services must be lodged with the RAF. Administrative arrangements whereby a hospital submits consolidated or combined claims that include the charges of multiple service providers (doctors, specialists, etc.) treating the same patient do not contravene s 17(5), provided the RAF receives proper documentation and can verify the services rendered. 2. Medical practitioners do not breach ethical rules under the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 or HPCSA guidelines merely by submitting their invoices through a hospital for inclusion in a consolidated claim to the RAF, where this arrangement is transparent, does not involve improper fee-sharing, and was initiated by the RAF itself to improve administrative efficiency. 3. An application under rule 45A of the Uniform Rules to stay execution of valid, uncontested court orders will be dismissed as an abuse of process where: (a) the party seeking the stay has not appealed or sought rescission of any of the underlying orders; (b) the party has complied with similar orders and made substantial payments over an extended period; (c) there is no evidence of irregularity in the specific claims underlying the orders; and (d) the allegations of unlawfulness are vague, speculative, and contradicted by the party's own investigations. 4. Under the amended s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (effective 3 April 2024), the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal has sole discretion to determine whether "a grave failure of justice would otherwise result or the administration of justice may be brought into disrepute" and whether to refer a decision refusing leave to appeal for reconsideration. When a referral is made, the Court's function is to reconsider whether the decision to refuse leave should be varied, not to re-assess whether the threshold for referral has been met. 5. An application becomes moot and not justiciable where the relief sought (stay of a sale in execution) has already been overtaken by events (the sale has occurred), and any decision would have no practical effect or result, absent exceptional circumstances justifying the court to pronounce on the matter.

1. The Court expressed concern about the RAF's non-compliance with the President's order to file six copies each of the initial application for leave to appeal and the s 17(2)(f) application as part of the record, though Sunshine did not ultimately pursue this point. Mbha AJA remarked that this non-compliance undermined the RAF's application. 2. The Court observed that the RAF's allegation that it made payments to Sunshine "under duress" to maintain operational functionality was unsubstantiated and its veracity was "at best, seriously questionable," given that payments were made over 15 years and even after launching the urgent application. 3. The judgment noted that the RAF's application to adduce new evidence was "unnecessary and an abuse of the process," criticizing the RAF for bringing such an application 14 months after already presenting the same alleged "new evidence" in the s 17(2)(f) application. 4. Mbha AJA commented that the RAF's assertion that claims were "possibly inflated" was "patently uncertain and speculative" and did not advance the RAF's case, particularly given that the FID report discounted this possibility. 5. The Court observed that despite the SIU investigating Sunshine since December 2021 pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No 44 of 2021, it had "evidently not found any wrongdoing" to date. 6. The judgment noted with apparent disapproval that the RAF's threatened application for a declarator that it was not liable for combined claims "has to date not been made," suggesting this further undermined the bona fides of the original rule 45A application. 7. The Court remarked that the RAF's reliance on investigation reports by multiple bodies (Universal, SNG, HPCSA, SIU) did not advance its case where: (a) some reports were not yet complete; (b) some investigated files that did not relate to the 181 court orders in question; and (c) none had produced concrete findings of wrongdoing. 8. The judgment emphasized that s 17(2)(f) "was not intended to afford disappointed litigants a further attempt to procure relief that has already been refused" and that applications which merely rehearse arguments already considered and rejected will not succeed, citing Avnit v First Rand Bank. 9. Mbha AJA observed that the RAF's conduct over many years—including making substantial payments on combined claims, consenting to judgments based on such claims, and allowing RAF employees stationed at Sunshine to facilitate the very practice it later challenged—demonstrated that the urgent application was "yet another attempt by the RAF to delay complying with court orders."

This case is significant in South African law for several reasons: 1. Interpretation of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act: The judgment clarifies the post-amendment (3 April 2024) operation of s 17(2)(f), emphasizing that it is solely within the President of the SCA's discretion to determine whether "a grave failure of justice would otherwise result or the administration of justice may be brought into disrepute" and whether to refer a matter for reconsideration. The Court's role on referral is to step into the shoes of the judges who dismissed the petition and determine whether variation is warranted, not to re-assess whether the threshold has been met. 2. Flexibility in claims procedures under the RAF Act: The judgment confirms that s 17(5) of the Road Accident Fund Act does not prescribe the manner in which claims must be lodged, allowing for efficient administrative arrangements such as consolidated or combined claims where multiple service providers' charges relating to the same patient are submitted together. 3. Abuse of process and finality of judgments: The case reinforces that valid court orders must be respected and cannot be collaterally attacked through procedural applications like rule 45A stay applications, especially where the party seeking the stay has failed to appeal or seek rescission of the underlying orders for extended periods. 4. Mootness doctrine: The judgment applies established mootness principles to prevent the court from issuing advisory opinions where the practical relief sought (stay of a sale in execution) has already been overtaken by events. 5. Requirements for admitting new evidence on appeal: The judgment demonstrates that alleged "new evidence" that was actually available to and known by the parties during the proceedings below, or that relates to issues already canvassed before the lower court, will not be admitted on appeal. 6. Cooperative arrangements between state entities and private parties: The case illustrates that long-standing cooperative arrangements between public entities like the RAF and private service providers can create legitimate practices and expectations that cannot be unilaterally repudiated without proper legal foundation.