Road Accident Fund v Lise Maloney and Others

On 21 June 2014 the deceased was involved in a motorcycle collision caused by another motor vehicle. He suffered serious injuries, including a comminuted fracture of his right tibia, a pelvic fracture, soft-tissue injuries and a mild concussion. After surgery and an eight-to-nine month recovery he was left with significant physical impairment, chronic pain and disfigurement that adversely affected his work as a self-employed artisan. He also had pre-existing financial strain, having lost a major plumbing contract. Approximately two and a half years after the collision, on 6 December 2016, he died by a self-inflicted gunshot wound. His widow (the first respondent) instituted a dependant’s claim for loss of support against the Road Accident Fund (RAF) in the Western Cape High Court on behalf of herself and their two minor children. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding no factual causal link because the deceased had not been diagnosed with a major depressive disorder. The full court upheld the appeal, holding that factual causation was established without a diagnosed mental illness, but it did not consider legal causation. The RAF was granted special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.

• Whether factual causation was established between the motor vehicle collision injuries and the deceased’s subsequent death by suicide.
• Whether the deceased’s deliberate act of suicide constituted a novus actus interveniens that broke the chain of legal causation.
• Whether a diagnosis of mental illness or cognitive impairment is required to prove that a suicide was caused by prior wrongful conduct.
• Whether the deceased’s suicide was reasonably foreseeable or sufficiently closely connected to the original wrongful and negligent conduct to justify attributing legal liability for loss of support.
• Whether legal liability attaches where a breadwinner of sound mind deliberately ends his own life following physical injuries caused by a third party’s wrongful conduct.

The appeal is upheld with costs. The order of the full court is set aside and replaced with the following order: ‘The appeal is dismissed with costs.’ This reinstates the trial court’s order dismissing the respondents’ claim for loss of support.

Factual causation between wrongful conduct and a subsequent suicide may be established on a but-for basis without proof of a diagnosed mental illness. However, where the deceased did not suffer from a cognizable psychological lesion or mental illness impairing judgment or volition, a deliberate suicide constitutes a novus actus interveniens that breaks the chain of legal causation. A wrongdoer will only be held liable for such a suicide if it was reasonably foreseeable or sufficiently closely connected to the original wrongful conduct; where the deceased was of sound mind and the suicide was not reasonably foreseeable given the passage of time and absence of mental impairment, legal causation is not established and the dependants’ claim for loss of support must fail.

The Court made non-binding observations regarding the cultural, religious and social contingency of perspectives on suicide and changing attitudes towards it, including references to euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. It remarked on the importance of precise pleadings where an intentional act such as suicide is sought to be causally attributed to prior wrongful conduct, and criticised the impermissible deductive reasoning of inferring mental impairment solely from the fact of suicide. The Court also noted that English authorities such as Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd and Reeves are distinguishable on their facts, and that while the consequences of suicide are tragic and evoke sympathy for survivors, established legal principles must nonetheless be applied.

The judgment is significant for South African delictual law as it clarifies the distinction between factual and legal causation in dependants’ loss-of-support claims involving suicide. It confirms that factual causation does not require proof of a diagnosed mental illness, but emphasises that a deliberate suicide by a person of sound mind—without a cognizable psychological lesion impairing volition—constitutes a novus actus interveniens that breaks the chain of legal causation unless the suicide was reasonably foreseeable. The case limits the liability of the RAF (and wrongdoers generally) for suicides arising from physical injuries where the deceased retains mental capacity, affirms constitutional values of autonomy and self-determination, and distinguishes Road Accident Fund v Russell on the basis of impaired volition.