Road Accident Fund v Kruger and Co and Others

Fortunate Dzvongo, a foreign national, sustained injuries in a motor vehicle crash on 8 June 2018. He lodged a claim with the Road Accident Fund (RAF) and issued summons in 2019. The parties settled the matter on 20 December 2022, and the settlement was made an order of court on 22 December 2022. At the time of the crash and settlement, there was no requirement for foreign claimants to prove legal presence in South Africa. Subsequently, in June/July 2022, RAF introduced a new approach requiring foreign claimants to provide proof of legal presence. When Dzvongo sought to execute on the court order in August 2023, RAF refused to pay, claiming it could not do so without proof of Dzvongo's legal presence at the time of the crash. The sheriff attached and removed movable property from RAF's premises on 18 September 2023. RAF then brought an urgent application to stay the execution pending determination of a similar matter (Mudawo v RAF) in the Gauteng Division. Additionally, RAF failed for over eight months to deliver the court file and a notice requesting written reasons for judgment to the judge, causing significant delay.

• Whether the execution of a court order based on a settlement agreement can be suspended under Rule 45A of the Uniform Rules of Court to allow a party to raise a new defence after the settlement has been made an order of court.
• Whether a change in administrative approach by the RAF (requiring proof of legal presence) constitutes a basis to resist payment under a pre-existing court order.
• Whether RAF's attorneys' failure to comply with Practice Directive 45A warrants a punitive costs order.

1. RAF was exempted from paying fees related to the delivery of the notice requesting reasons for judgment and the file to the Judge's chambers. 2. The costs occasioned by the delay in timeous delivery of the file to the Judge's chambers, including preparations for and attendance of the Directives hearing, were ordered to be paid by RAF's attorneys of record.

Rule 45A of the Uniform Rules of Court, which allows for suspension of execution of court orders, must only be invoked where real and substantial justice requires it. The rule cannot be used to resuscitate a dispute that has already been settled and made an order of court, nor to construct a new defence after a compromise has been reached. A party who settles a dispute and has the terms made an order of court cannot later seek to challenge the underlying merits of that order.

None clearly discernible.

This case clarifies the limits of Rule 45A of the Uniform Rules of Court, affirming that the rule cannot be used to undermine the sanctity and finality of court orders made by consent. It reinforces the principle that settlements made orders of court are final and binding, and that a litigant cannot escape their obligations under a consent order by later raising new defences or changing administrative policies. It also underscores the professional duties of legal practitioners to diligently comply with court directives and the consequences of failing to do so, including personal costs orders.