Rasmos Pasipanodya v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company Zimbabwe Limited and Zimbabwe Platinum Mines and The Minister of Finance and Economic Development

The applicant was employed by the second respondent (Zimbabwe Platinum Mines) and was a member of a pension scheme underwritten by the first respondent (Old Mutual). During his employment, contributions were made in United States dollars. The applicant was diagnosed with pneumoconiosis in October 2018, and his employment was terminated on 25 April 2019 due to ill-health. He was entitled to a benefit equivalent to two years' salary amounting to US$22,944.00. The first respondent paid RTGS$22,944.00 instead of US dollars. The applicant argued that he should be paid in US dollars as the contributions were made in that currency, or alternatively that section 22(1)(d) of the Finance Act No. 2 of 2019 (which incorporated S.I. 33/2019 converting USD obligations to RTGS dollars at 1:1) should be declared unconstitutional. The applicant also argued that the second respondent was negligent in advising the first respondent of the termination after the currency changes introduced by S.I. 33/2019 on 22 February 2019.

• Whether the first and second respondents were liable to pay the applicant US$22,944.00 instead of RTGS$22,944.00
• Whether the second respondent was negligent in submitting the claim after the currency changes
• What date should be considered for determining when the liability accrued - the date of diagnosis (October 2018), date of termination (April 2019), or date of claim notification (May 2019)
• Whether the first and second respondents should be indemnified by the third respondent if found liable
• Whether section 22(1)(d) of the Finance Act No. 2 of 2019 is unconstitutional as it constitutes unlawful deprivation of property in breach of section 71 of the Constitution and/or breach of the right to equal protection and benefit of the law under section 56(1) of the Constitution

The application was dismissed with costs against the applicant.

The binding principle is that for purposes of applying currency conversion legislation (S.I. 33/2019), the relevant date is when the liability accrues and becomes payable, not when the underlying events or contributions occurred. In an insurance/pension context, the liability accrues when the insured event is established and payment is triggered (here, the date of termination), not the date of diagnosis or initial incapacity. Assets and liabilities denominated in US dollars immediately before the effective date of 22 February 2019 are converted to RTGS dollars at 1:1 when the liability is liquidated or discharged. Further, constitutional challenges must be properly pleaded as primary relief with full supporting arguments, and cannot be raised as alternative or by-the-way relief.

The court observed that the application was "clearly ill-conceived." The court noted that even in the alternative relief sought (payment at the prevailing exchange rate), the applicant failed to calculate or plead the actual amount claimed, which demonstrated poor pleading. The court also commented that there was confusion in the applicant's papers regarding which section of the Finance Act was allegedly unconstitutional (section 22(1)(d) in the main papers versus section 23 in the draft order). The court emphasized that it does not make pleadings for litigants. The court also noted in passing that whether the termination of employment was lawful or unlawful was not an issue before the court and was irrelevant to the currency question.

This case illustrates the application of Zimbabwe's currency conversion legislation (S.I. 33/2019 as incorporated into the Finance Act No. 2 of 2019) to insurance and pension benefits. It confirms that the critical date for determining whether an obligation should be paid in US dollars or RTGS dollars is when the liability accrued, not when the underlying events giving rise to the liability occurred. The case also reinforces the principle established in CABS v Stone that constitutional challenges must be properly and comprehensively pleaded as the primary relief sought, and cannot be raised as alternative or incidental relief. While this is a Zimbabwean case and not directly binding in South African law, it demonstrates approaches to currency conversion issues and constitutional litigation that may have comparative relevance.