Ramafamba v Score Supermarkets (Trading) (Pty) Ltd

Maria Shumani Ramafamba went shopping at Score Supermarket in Sibasa, Venda on 21 October 2005. While walking in a shopping aisle towards the bakery section, she tripped and fell, sustaining an injury to her left leg. She alleged that she tripped over loose shelves lying on the floor of the aisle, which she had not seen before falling as they were cream-colored like the floor. She claimed the shelves were displaced when she fell. A promotional worker helped her and the store manager, Mr Nemaname, came to assist, taking her to hospital, paying her medical expenses, and visiting her the next day. No witness saw her fall, and no shelves were observed by store employees. Her pleadings originally referred to tripping over a 'shelf end' placed negligently on the customer path, though her evidence at trial referred to 'loose shelves' piled on the floor. Store employees (Mr Nemaname and Mr Matsea) denied that any loose shelves were on the floor, denied seeing her fall, and testified there were no casual workers (whom she alleged had left the shelves there). The trial court separated liability from quantum at the outset.

• Whether the appellant discharged the onus of proving that the respondents negligently caused her injury
• Whether the appellant proved how she fell and that the respondents were responsible for the fall
• Whether the high court correctly found the respondents negligent despite accepting their evidence that no loose shelves were on the floor
• Whether absolution from the instance should have been granted

1. The appeal was dismissed with costs. 2. The cross-appeal was upheld with costs. 3. The order of the high court was replaced with: 'Absolution from the instance is granted with costs.'

Where a plaintiff does not prove the cause of her injury, she cannot succeed in an action against defendants for negligently causing her loss. A plaintiff bears the onus of proving both how the injury occurred and that the defendant was responsible for causing it through negligence. Where there are material discrepancies between pleadings and evidence, where credible witnesses for the defendant deny the factual basis of the claim, and where the probabilities do not support the plaintiff's version, the plaintiff fails to discharge the onus of proof and absolution from the instance should be granted.

The Court observed that humanitarian conduct by a store manager in assisting an injured customer (taking them to hospital, paying medical expenses, and visiting them) does not constitute an admission of liability for negligence. Such conduct is simply that of 'a humane man who came to the assistance of a person who had fallen in the store he managed.' The Court also commented on the inadequacy of the way the claim was pleaded, the inadequacy of evidence led, and the manner in which the trial was conducted, noting that what 'seems a simple enough thing to do' (proving how one fell) was not achieved due to these deficiencies.

This case reinforces fundamental principles regarding the burden of proof in delictual actions. It confirms that a plaintiff must prove both the cause of the injury and that the defendant's negligence caused it. The case demonstrates the importance of consistency between pleadings and evidence, and the consequences when a plaintiff fails to discharge the onus of proof. It also illustrates that a court cannot make findings of negligence against defendants whose witnesses are accepted as credible when those witnesses deny the factual basis for the negligence claim. The judgment clarifies that humanitarian assistance following an incident does not constitute an admission of liability. It serves as an important precedent on when absolution from the instance is appropriate - where a plaintiff fundamentally fails to prove their case on a balance of probabilities.