Paulina Ninkie Skhosana v The Executive Committee of Melkbosch Village Homeowners Association

The applicant, Ms Paulina Ninkie Skhosana, is the owner of unit 23 in Melkbosch Village and became a member of the Melkbosch Village Homeowners Association (MVHOA) by virtue of ownership. Her property was registered in her name on 5 July 2022. She alleged that the previous managing agent failed to inform her of the levies payable from the date of registration and that she only began receiving statements in January 2023. She contended that, because no monthly statements were sent to her during that period, she should not be liable for levies charged from 5 July 2022 to January 2023, and sought an adjustment of those contributions under section 39(1)(c) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. The respondent HOA maintained that levy liability arises automatically from the date of registration and ownership, not from the sending of an invoice or statement, and stated that it had not charged interest or collection fees during the dispute.

• Whether levies charged by a homeowners association from the date of registration of ownership are invalid, incorrectly determined, or unreasonable because the owner did not receive statements or notice of the levies.
• Whether, under section 39(1)(c) of the CSOS Act, the applicant was entitled to an order adjusting or setting aside levy contributions for the period before she was notified of them.
• Whether the application was without substance and liable to dismissal under section 53(1)(a) of the CSOS Act.
• Whether a costs order should be made against the applicant under section 53(2) of the CSOS Act.

The application was dismissed as being without substance in terms of section 53(1)(a) of the CSOS Act. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

In a homeowners association governed by its constitution, a member's obligation to pay levies commences upon registration of ownership. The absence of statements, invoices, or prior notice from the managing agent does not negate that pre-existing obligation. Accordingly, levy contributions charged from the date of registration are not, without more, incorrectly determined or unreasonable for purposes of section 39(1)(c) of the CSOS Act. Where such a challenge lacks substantive merit, the application may be dismissed under section 53(1)(a) as without substance.

The adjudicator observed that levies are the 'lifeblood' of shared living schemes and that non-payment can seriously destabilise a scheme by undermining maintenance, insurance, security, and the collective interests of owners. The adjudicator also commented that decisions of estate governing bodies are subject to norms of reasonableness and that courts may intervene against capricious decisions, although capriciousness was not ultimately the basis for decision here.

The decision confirms, in the CSOS context, that an owner's liability for HOA levies ordinarily arises automatically from the date of transfer and registration of ownership, not only once statements or invoices are sent. It reinforces the principle that administrative or managerial failures in notification do not, without more, render levy contributions unreasonable under section 39(1)(c) of the CSOS Act. The matter is also significant for showing the limited statutory jurisdiction of CSOS adjudicators and their ability to dismiss misconceived applications as without substance under section 53.