The plaintiff instituted an action against Eskom for damages of R1,500,000 arising from a fire that destroyed her main house and a rondavel. The plaintiff alleged that the fire was caused by the bursting of an electric meter box in her kitchen, which she claimed to have heard as a loud bang while she was changing clothes after returning from church. The fire spread rapidly due to strong winds, destroying furniture, appliances, and important documents. The plaintiff's home was situated in a rural area. A technical investigation report by Mr Ronaldo Same noted that no one was present when the fire occurred, the cause was unknown, and it was impossible to determine the cause due to lack of eyewitnesses. The report also noted that the Mineral Insulated Cable (MCB) did not suffer stripping. Ms Ncebakazi Dyalvane, a senior technical official from Eskom, testified that she attended the site on 10 August 2020 after receiving a report of a cable fault and house fire, and that the plaintiff told her no one was present when the fire started. There were contradictions between the plaintiff's testimony about being present and hearing the bang, and the technical reports indicating no witnesses.
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed. 2. Each party shall pay its own costs.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) The presumption of negligence under section 25 of the Electrical Regulation Act 4 of 2005 can be rebutted by credible evidence to the contrary; (2) Technical investigation reports compiled contemporaneously with an incident carry significant weight in rebutting the statutory presumption, particularly where they indicate the cause of damage was unknown and there were no eyewitnesses; (3) To succeed in a negligence claim against an electricity licensee, even with the benefit of the statutory presumption, the plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant failed to take reasonable steps that a diligens paterfamilias would have taken to prevent the harm (applying Kruger v Coetzee); (4) Evidence that safety mechanisms (such as MCBs) did not fail and cable integrity was maintained supports a finding that the defendant took reasonable precautionary steps; (5) Where the actual cause of a fire or electrical damage cannot be established on a balance of probabilities, the plaintiff's claim must fail even under the statutory presumption regime.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) It acknowledged that the elderly plaintiff, testifying about events five years prior, may have honestly mistaken her recollection rather than deliberately providing false testimony, and noted that any mistake in her narrative did not favor her case; (2) The court observed that a thorough technical investigation by experts with requisite expertise would have been highly valuable to the proceedings; (3) The court noted that the use of the word "fault" for reporting purposes does not necessarily establish on a balance of probabilities that an actual fault existed in the meter box; (4) Regarding costs, the court observed that while the plaintiff's counsel arrived very late to court on 09 April 2025, his explanation was valid and the logistical arrangements he never anticipated placed him in a difficult position, therefore not warranting the drastic step of costs de bonis propriis; (5) The court further noted that although the defendant won the case, the circumstances did not warrant an award of costs, suggesting that each party should bear its own costs - this reflects the court's discretion to consider the overall justice of the matter beyond the mere outcome.
This case illustrates the application of section 25 of the Electrical Regulation Act 4 of 2005, which creates a presumption of negligence against electricity licensees in civil proceedings for damage or injury caused by electricity. The judgment demonstrates that this presumption is rebuttable and can be overcome with credible evidence to the contrary. The case also reinforces the principles for resolving factual disputes where there are mutually destructive versions, emphasizing the importance of contemporaneous technical evidence over subsequent testimony about events that occurred years earlier. It clarifies that in delictual claims, even where a statutory presumption exists, the plaintiff must still discharge the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, and contradictions in the plaintiff's version compared to objective technical evidence may be fatal to the claim. The case also provides guidance on the exercise of judicial discretion regarding costs, including when costs de bonis propriis should not be awarded despite procedural delays.