Hlalanathi Ngwadla v The State

During the early hours of 23 November 2014, the deceased, Klaas Matsipe, was fatally stabbed in the head. A single eyewitness, Mr Isaac Papie Riet, testified that he saw the appellant and two other men surrounding the deceased outside the appellant's residence, making dance-like movements with raised hands and legs. The deceased fell, and the men carried him out of the yard and left him in the street. Mr Riet saw a knife in the appellant's hand when the deceased was being carried. Mr Riet did not see the actual stabbing. The deceased was a state witness in a separate murder case against the appellant and his brother. The appellant and his brother were later arrested and charged with murder. The appellant denied involvement, claiming that a friend named Lulu stabbed the deceased and that he merely carried the deceased out of the yard so an ambulance could find him.

• Whether the evidence of a single witness was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder.
• Whether reliance on the doctrine of common purpose was competent in the absence of an allegation thereof in the charge sheet.
• The proper approach to circumstantial evidence and inferential reasoning.
• Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the deceased's death.

The appeal succeeded. The full bench's order was set aside and replaced with an order setting aside the appellant's conviction and sentence. The appellant was found not guilty, acquitted, and ordered to be released promptly.

A conviction for murder cannot be sustained based on the doctrine of common purpose where the State did not invoke or rely on that doctrine in the charge sheet or during the trial, as this infringes the accused's right to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it. Additionally, where the only eyewitness's evidence is unreliable, improbable, and does not establish who inflicted the fatal wound, and where alternative inferences consistent with innocence cannot be excluded, the State has not discharged its burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The dissenting judgment noted that an accused can be convicted of murder on circumstantial evidence without resorting to the doctrine of common purpose, and that the trial court is not obliged to mention every aspect in its judgment. The majority noted the trial court's failure to exercise its power under s 186 of the Criminal Procedure Act to subpoena medical records regarding the deceased's surgical treatment, which may have clarified whether there were one or two stab wounds.

This case reinforces the principle that the State must clearly plead reliance on common purpose in the charge sheet or through evidence at trial; an accused cannot be convicted on that basis if it was never raised. It also illustrates the rigorous approach appellate courts must take in evaluating single-witness evidence and circumstantial evidence, affirming that factual findings of lower courts are not immune from scrutiny where there are demonstrable misdirections or where the evidence plainly does not support the conviction.