This case is significant for establishing important principles regarding confiscation proceedings under POCA: (1) It clarifies that an insolvent retains locus standi in confiscation proceedings where he has a direct and substantial interest, even after sequestration, particularly where trustees elect not to participate. This protects the constitutional right of access to courts. (2) It confirms that 'benefit' under POCA is defined broadly to include gross proceeds, not just net profit, following S v Shaik. (3) However, it establishes that courts must exercise discretion in determining the appropriate amount to confiscate, taking into account capital outlays and ensuring a rational connection between the benefit derived and the amount confiscated. (4) It clarifies the procedure for s 18 enquiries, emphasizing that these are inquisitorial proceedings where the court plays an active role, not adversarial civil applications. Importantly, it holds that s 18(1) does not place a true onus on the State (disagreeing with York Timbers). (5) It emphasizes the court's duty under s 18(6) to actively manage the enquiry and call for additional evidence where insufficient information exists to make a proper determination. (6) The judgment reinforces that confiscation orders must be fair and proportionate, not result in unjust enrichment of the State, and must account for the realities of how proceeds were used, particularly in construction contracts where substantial costs are incurred in performance.