The applicant was a student at Rhodes University in 2022. In 2023, he was found guilty of sexual assault of a fellow student in disciplinary proceedings and was sanctioned with three years' exclusion from the university. An internal appeal was unsuccessful. The applicant launched a review application to set aside the Proctor's decision. On 10 July 2024, Malusi J granted an order suspending the Proctor's decision pending finalisation of the review, directing Rhodes to admit the applicant as a student for the 2024 academic year and that parties should meet within 10 days to agree on academic schedule and residence. Rhodes applied for leave to appeal against parts of this order. The applicant was enrolled for 2024 and wrote examinations. When seeking his results, he discovered he had been excluded from Rhodes as of 2 February 2024. On 12 November 2024, Norman J granted an order staying the applicant's urgent applications and restraining him from launching further proceedings without court permission under the Vexatious Proceedings Act. The applicant then launched this contempt application, alleging Rhodes breached Malusi J's order by refusing him residence and excluding him from Rhodes.
The application is dismissed with costs on a party and party scale.
For an applicant to succeed in a civil contempt application, all requirements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, including: (1) the existence of an order; (2) service or notice of the order; (3) non-compliance with the order; and (4) wilfulness and mala fides. A court order must be interpreted according to its plain meaning and express terms - where an order requires specific action for a particular time period (such as admission for the 2024 academic year), it cannot be interpreted to extend to subsequent periods not mentioned in the order, as such interpretation would lead to absurd results. A university's decision not to admit a student based on outstanding debts and lack of payment arrangements is an administrative decision for the institution to make based on its own requirements and policies, and does not constitute contempt of an order requiring admission based on suspension of a disciplinary sanction.
The court warned the applicant (who appeared in person) that unfounded allegations of lies against the university's deponent and suggestions of some improper relationship between the court and the university could well have resulted in a punitive costs order. The court noted that even as a layperson, the applicant should know to moderate his language in public court documents. The court also observed, without finally deciding, that it would assume the applicant had followed the correct procedure for obtaining leave under section 2(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act and that the requirements for such leave were met, preferring to deal with the merits of the contempt application.
This case illustrates the strict requirements for establishing civil contempt of court in South Africa, particularly the need to prove all elements beyond reasonable doubt. It demonstrates the application of the Fakie test for contempt proceedings. The case also addresses issues of interpretation of interim court orders in the context of student disciplinary matters, confirming that such orders must be interpreted according to their plain meaning and time limitations. It shows the court's reluctance to interfere with universities' administrative decisions regarding student admissions based on financial and other internal policies. The case also touches on the operation of the Vexatious Proceedings Act in the context of litigants who pursue multiple proceedings.