Monye v The State

On 8 November 2011, Chanelle Henning was shot and killed in a premeditated contract killing. Two men, Martin Pieterse and Petrus Gerhardus du Plessis, followed the deceased from her home to her son's crèche on a motorcycle. After she dropped off her four-year-old son, du Plessis approached her vehicle and shot her twice at point-blank range, causing her death. The murder was orchestrated as a contract killing. The deceased's husband, Nico Henning, allegedly wanted custody of their son during divorce proceedings and promised Gouws (the second appellant and a friend of 24 years) R1 million to have the deceased killed. Gouws instructed Monye (the first appellant) to find someone to execute the killing, promising him R50,000. Monye arranged with Pieterse and du Plessis to carry out the killing. Gouws provided crucial information including the deceased's security complex, her son's crèche location, her workplace, and her vehicle registration number, warning them not to shoot while her son was present. Five people were arrested. The person who supplied the firearm had murder charges withdrawn. Pieterse and du Plessis entered into plea and sentence agreements under section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act, each receiving 18 years' imprisonment and testifying against the appellants. Both appellants pleaded not guilty at trial. They were convicted of murder and acquitted of firearm-related charges. Only during sentencing proceedings did they admit their roles and concede guilt. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment and appealed against sentence only with leave of the trial court.

• Whether there were substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment for premeditated murder under section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
• Whether the appellants demonstrated genuine remorse
• Whether the appellants' late cooperation with authorities and willingness to testify against the alleged instigator constituted a substantial and compelling circumstance
• Whether the trial court misdirected itself in imposing life imprisonment

The appeals of both appellants were dismissed and the sentences of life imprisonment for both appellants were confirmed.

In contract killing cases, the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment under section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act will not be departed from absent substantial and compelling circumstances that provide truly convincing reasons or weighty justification. Late cooperation with authorities after conviction, when opportunistic and not demonstrating genuine remorse, does not constitute a substantial and compelling circumstance. Genuine remorse requires acknowledgment and appreciation of the extent of one's error and must be assessed by examining the surrounding actions of the accused rather than courtroom statements. Remorse is absent where an accused denies involvement throughout investigation and trial, only admitting guilt when exposed by co-accused during sentencing proceedings, and fails to testify under oath to allow testing of alleged remorse. Middlemen in contract killings whose roles were pivotal and central to the commission of the murder are properly sentenced to life imprisonment where the killing was premeditated, motivated by greed, involved an innocent victim, and where deterrence and retribution are paramount given the deadly danger such crimes pose to society.

The court observed that it is uncertain which is worse: a contract killer who kills for money (acting from greed) or one who kills without payment (being clearly without a conscience). The court noted the ancient expression 'homo homini lupus' (a man is a wolf to another man) has particularly sombre meaning in the context of contract killings. The court commented that South African society is seriously threatened by contract killings and dared not tolerate such conduct. The court observed that there is a chasm between regret and remorse, noting that many accused persons might regret their conduct but this does not translate to genuine remorse without more. The court stated that remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another, and genuine contrition can only come from appreciation and acknowledgment of the extent of one's error. The court noted that it is not wrong for natural indignation of interested persons and the community to receive recognition in sentencing, and that if sentences for serious crimes are too lenient, the administration of justice may fall into disrepute and injured persons may be inclined to take the law into their own hands, though righteous anger should not becloud judgment.

This case reinforces South African jurisprudence on sentencing for contract killings and the application of minimum sentencing legislation. It clarifies that: (1) Contract killings will attract severe sentences except in exceptional cases; (2) Late cooperation with authorities after conviction, when opportunistic rather than demonstrating genuine remorse, does not constitute a substantial and compelling circumstance; (3) True remorse requires more than regret and must be demonstrated through actions, not merely words in court; (4) The court will look to surrounding actions of the accused rather than what they say in court to determine genuine remorse; (5) Personal circumstances and being first offenders or having families do not outweigh the gravity of contract killing; (6) The roles of middlemen in contract killings are treated as seriously as those of the actual killers when their involvement was pivotal to the crime; (7) Deterrence and retribution are paramount considerations in sentencing for contract killings given the profound danger such crimes pose to society. The judgment emphasizes that the courts have a duty to visit contract killers with the severest punishment to combat this type of atrocity, reflecting society's condemnation of such crimes.