Kriegler J made several non-binding observations: (1) The inclusion of civilian judicial oversight through appointment of high court judges to higher military courts demonstrates constitutional safeguards against abuse. (2) The potential for concurrent jurisdiction between civilian and military courts over soldier offences has always existed and has historically been managed through liaison and cooperation, which is now required by the constitutional principles of cooperative government in Chapter 3. (3) If the Constitution intended to radically alter the military justice system by subjecting military prosecutions to civilian control, it would have done so explicitly in Chapter 11 dealing with security services, not implicitly through section 179 in the chapter on courts. (4) The Constitution provides extensive safeguards against military abuse through civilian control mechanisms in Chapter 11 (sections 198-204), including parliamentary oversight, ministerial responsibility, and the President as Commander-in-Chief. Protection against abuse of military authority is therefore achieved through these mechanisms rather than through prosecutorial control by the NDPP. (5) If protection of soldiers was the purpose, it would logically be at the adjudicatory rather than prosecutorial level, as independent judges are 'well-placed to curb possible abuse of prosecutorial power'. (6) Extra-territorial military offences present practical difficulties for NDPP control, as the NDPP's jurisdiction is confined to South Africa while military discipline must extend to wherever SANDF members serve globally.