The Court made several significant non-binding observations: (1) Kriegler J emphasized that modern soldiers in a constitutional democracy should be 'thinking men and women imbued with the values of the Constitution' while also being disciplined, reflecting an understanding of military service that balances constitutional rights with military necessity; (2) The Court noted that military discipline serves fundamentally different objectives from civilian criminal prosecution – it is about maintaining an effective armed force capable of protecting territorial integrity, not primarily about law and order in society; (3) The judgment observed that military disciplinary decisions require knowledge of unit dynamics, morale, interpersonal relationships, command structures and military considerations that civilian prosecutors cannot reasonably possess; (4) The Court commented that if section 179 were intended to protect soldiers from abuse, it would be 'strangely ineffectual' to provide that protection at the prosecutorial rather than adjudicatory level, noting that independent judges are 'well-placed to curb possible abuse of prosecutorial power'; (5) Kriegler J noted that there has historically been cooperation between civilian and military prosecuting authorities where jurisdiction overlaps, and that such cooperation would now be constitutionally mandated by Chapter 3's principles of cooperative government; (6) The Court observed that no comparable country was cited as having a system where military prosecutions are controlled by civilian prosecutorial authorities; (7) The judgment commented that civilian control of the military is comprehensively addressed through Chapter 11's provisions for political accountability to Cabinet and Parliament, parliamentary oversight, and the requirement for a civilian secretariat for defence.