Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others v Reddell and Others

The applicants (mining companies and their executives) instituted three defamation actions totalling over R14 million against the respondents (environmental lawyers and activists) for statements made criticizing the mining companies' operations at the Tormin and Xolobeni mineral sands projects. The allegedly defamatory statements were made during university lectures, radio interviews, in e-books, social media posts, and various public forums. The respondents raised a special plea asserting that the defamation actions constituted SLAPP suits (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) brought for the ulterior purpose of silencing critics and discouraging public participation on environmental matters, rather than to genuinely vindicate rights. The respondents pleaded that the actions were an abuse of process based solely on the mining companies' improper motive. The mining companies excepted to this special plea, arguing that it disclosed no defence in law as South African law does not recognize a SLAPP suit defence based on ulterior motive alone, and that any abuse of process inquiry must consider the merits of the underlying claim. The High Court dismissed the exception, finding in favor of the environmentalists.

• Whether South African common law currently recognizes a SLAPP suit defence to a defamation claim
• Whether ulterior motive alone, without consideration of the merits of a claim, can constitute an abuse of process sufficient to dismiss an action
• Whether the common law doctrine of abuse of process should be developed to accommodate a SLAPP suit defence
• What role merits and motive play in an abuse of process inquiry
• Whether leave to appeal should be granted directly to the Constitutional Court in respect of the dismissal of an exception
• Whether the respondents' special plea disclosed a defence known to law

1. Leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court granted. 2. The appeal is upheld. 3. The High Court order is set aside and replaced with: (a) The plaintiffs' exception to the first special plea of the defendants is upheld on the basis that the first special plea lacks averments necessary to establish a defence; (b) The defendants are afforded 30 days to seek leave to amend their first special plea, failing which the first special plea is dismissed. 4. The applicants are ordered to pay 60% of the respondents' costs in the Constitutional Court, including costs of two counsel. 5. Each party must pay its own costs in the High Court.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) South African common law recognizes a SLAPP suit defence as a species of abuse of process, termed "abusive litigation"; (2) A SLAPP suit defence cannot be established on the basis of ulterior motive alone - both the merits of the underlying claim and the motive for bringing it must be considered; (3) To succeed with a SLAPP suit defence, a defendant must prove: (a) the action is an abuse of process of court; (b) it is not brought to genuinely vindicate a right; (c) it amounts to the use of court process to achieve an improper end and to cause the defendant financial or other prejudice in order to silence them; and (d) it violates, or is likely to materially violate, the right to freedom of expression entrenched in section 16 of the Constitution; (4) Abusive litigation falls within the common law doctrine of abuse of process and consists of consideration of the merits of and motives for bringing a case, together with its likely consequences; (5) Courts have the power at common law and under section 173 of the Constitution to prevent abusive litigation; (6) The various forms of abuse of process are distinguishable and do not all have one common feature - different types of abuse require different considerations (e.g., vexatious litigation focuses on merits and repetition, while illegal arrests focus on legality regardless of motive); (7) An abuse of process inquiry is always fact-specific and requires close examination of all relevant circumstances.

The Court made several important non-binding observations: (1) It noted the positive feature of South Africa's democracy is "vibrant, vigilant and vociferous civil society participation in public affairs" and that environmental interests lobbies are notably active voices; (2) The Court observed that SLAPP suits appear to be increasing in South Africa, as globally; (3) The judgment contains extensive discussion of anti-SLAPP legislation in California and Canada (Ontario and British Columbia), noting these jurisdictions provide quick, effective and inexpensive mechanisms including: early stage motions to strike, burden-shifting between parties, stay of discovery pending determination, and consideration of both merits (probability of success) and public interest factors; (4) The Court suggested that "it is for Parliament to consider whether a more comprehensive, specific SLAPP suit defence of the kind developed in Canada and the United States of America, ought to be legislated here" as "Parliament is, generally speaking, the main engine for law reform"; (5) The Court noted that SLAPP suits are not limited to environmental litigation but are encountered in various types of litigation, though environmentalists appear to be particularly targeted; (6) The judgment observed that SLAPP suits "evince a deeper contestation in society" representing "the increasing contest between the competing interests of developers pursuing their property rights, and environmentalists pursuing conservation objectives"; (7) The Court emphasized that "meaningful public participation" is a key requirement in environmental legislation under section 24 of the Constitution and section 2(4)(f) of NEMA; (8) The Court noted that determining a SLAPP suit requires a more nuanced approach than simply considering ulterior purpose, and that parties had conflated different categories of abuse of process.

This is the first South African case to comprehensively address SLAPP suits (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) at the Constitutional Court level. The judgment is significant because it: (1) recognizes that SLAPP suit defences can be accommodated within the common law doctrine of abuse of process without requiring legislative intervention or common law development; (2) establishes a new category of "abusive litigation" as a species of abuse of process; (3) clarifies that both merits and motive must be considered in abuse of process inquiries related to SLAPP suits, rejecting extreme positions that either factor alone is determinative; (4) protects constitutional rights to freedom of expression and public participation, particularly in environmental matters where meaningful public participation is constitutionally required; (5) provides guidance for balancing competing rights between a plaintiff's right to vindicate reputation and a defendant's right to freedom of expression on matters of public importance; (6) recognizes the growing phenomenon of SLAPP suits in South Africa and provides a framework for courts to address them; and (7) signals to Parliament that it may wish to consider specific anti-SLAPP legislation as developed in jurisdictions like Canada and the United States. The judgment is particularly important for environmental activists, whistle-blowers, media institutions, and civil society organizations who engage in public interest advocacy and may face intimidation through costly litigation.