The second applicant (father) and the first respondent (Gateway Primary School) had a longstanding dispute over WhatsApp messages that affected the first applicant (his minor daughter), a grade seven pupil at the school. Two previous consent orders had been granted in HC 6567/18 (17 July 2018) and HC 8214/18 (13 September 2018), allowing the child to continue her education until completing grade seven, while prohibiting the father from interfering with the school's operations. The second consent order (HC 8214/18) provided that if the second applicant breached the order, the respondents could seek a court order terminating the contract. On 14 May 2019, the school unilaterally terminated the contract without obtaining a court order, effectively expelling the first applicant. Contempt of court proceedings in HC 2987/19 were pending against the second applicant for alleged breach of previous orders. The applicants brought an urgent application for the child's readmission to school.
Provisional order granted with variation. The court ordered: (1) First applicant to be readmitted to school until completing primary education; (2) The respondents through their functionaries to set aside and withdraw their decision to terminate the contract; (3) Fourth respondent to readmit the first applicant forthwith and allow her to continue normal lessons unless there is a valid court order terminating the contract in accordance with HC 8214/18; (4) Third respondent to issue formal withdrawal of the purported termination. Leave granted to applicants' legal practitioners to serve the order on each respondent.
The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 81(2) of the Constitution makes a child's best interests paramount in every matter concerning the child, which includes the right to education under section 81(1)(f); (2) The constitutional right to education is not limited to state-funded schools under section 75 but extends to private schools through section 81; (3) Where consent orders provide that a party must seek a court order before taking specific action (such as terminating a contract), that party cannot act unilaterally without obtaining such court order; (4) Children cannot be denied their constitutional rights based on allegations against their parents that remain pending adjudication; (5) In determining whether a prima facie case exists for a provisional order under Rule 246(2), the court must assess whether evidence has been placed before it from which a court properly directed could or might find for the applicant - a standard lower than proof on balance of probabilities; (6) Rule 4C permits departure from procedural rules (including Rule 249 regarding curator ad litem) in the interests of justice, particularly where a child's fundamental rights are at immediate risk.
The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The court described the respondents' reliance on section 75 to deny educational rights as "fallacious" and demonstrating "arrogance and a lack of appreciation of the broad fundamental rights of children"; (2) The court noted it was "hypocritical" for respondents to take action interfering with the child's education while claiming to enforce previous orders; (3) The court observed that the notice of opposition was "simply a regurgitation of the contempt of court proceedings" and that respondents were attempting to "usurp the powers of the court"; (4) The court characterized the submission that a curator ad litem application should be filed simultaneously with urgent relief as "preposterous"; (5) The court noted that the real reason respondents wanted the applicants out was revealed in their statement that they were "tired of this issue and cannot stomach it anymore"; (6) The court emphasized that while parties have a right to pursue legal remedies, they "cannot be allowed to act in defiance of court orders" or "seek to circumvent court processes"; (7) The judgment endorsed the definition of prima facie case from Balasore Alloys Ltd HH-228-18.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean jurisprudence for establishing that: (1) A child's constitutional right to education under section 81 of the Constitution extends to private schools and is not limited to state-funded institutions under section 75; (2) The best interests of the child principle in section 81(2) is paramount and overrides contractual disputes between parents and schools; (3) Children cannot be punished or prejudiced for the alleged wrongdoings of their parents; (4) Consent orders must be respected and parties cannot unilaterally act in defiance of clear terms requiring court authorization for specific actions; (5) The appointment of a curator ad litem under Rule 249 is not always necessary where it would prejudice urgent relief for a child's fundamental rights; (6) The clean hands doctrine does not automatically bar relief where a child's best interests are at stake and allegations remain unproven in pending proceedings. The judgment reinforces constitutional protections for children's educational rights and the primacy of the best interests principle.