Madleen Albertina Marike Bredenhann v Die Staat

Three women (a 27-year-old daughter, her mother, and maternal grandmother) lived together in a house in a suburb of Pretoria. The mother and grandmother shared a bedroom, and the daughter (the appellant) slept in a separate adjacent bedroom. During the early morning hours of Saturday 13 April 2003, the mother and grandmother were brutally attacked with an axe while lying in their beds. Both died from their injuries. The appellant was charged with the murder of her mother and grandmother. Neighbours woke between 4-5am due to dogs barking and heard noises, including a window breaking - which turned out to be the appellant's bedroom window. One neighbour saw the appellant outside the window removing glass from her hair; another saw her inside the room taking something from a closet. The appellant went to the police station around 5am and reported a break-in, saying there was blood in her mother and grandmother's room. Police found blood spatters on her arm and later on her blouse. At the murder scene, both deceased were found lying on their respective beds, having been struck with multiple axe blows to the head. A bloodstained axe was found on the grandmother's bed. Forensic evidence established that the blood on the axe was the mother's blood, the blood on the appellant's blouse was her mother's blood, and that to get that type of blood spatter, the appellant must have been standing no more than two metres from the deceased when the blows were delivered. Both deceased had sleeping medication in their blood. The appellant gave various inconsistent oral statements to different people about what had happened that morning.

• Whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of murder rather than being an accessory after the fact to murder
• Whether the circumstantial evidence excluded every reasonable inference except that the appellant was guilty of murder
• Whether the second test in R v Blom was satisfied - namely whether the proved facts excluded every reasonable inference save the one sought to be drawn
• Whether the appellant was a principal perpetrator or a co-perpetrator who approved of and associated herself with the murders
• Whether there was a reasonable possibility that the appellant was merely a non-approving bystander who witnessed the murders and subsequently protected the actual perpetrator

The appeal was dismissed. The conviction for two counts of murder and sentences of two terms of life imprisonment were confirmed.

Where an accused is present at a murder scene and the victim's blood is found on the accused's clothing in a pattern consistent with being in close proximity when fatal blows were struck, and the accused gives demonstrably false explanations for these facts, and the accused's subsequent conduct is inconsistent with being an innocent or non-approving bystander, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused either committed the murder personally or was a co-perpetrator who approved of and actively assisted in the commission of the crime. In applying the test in R v Blom, where the proved facts exclude all other reasonable inferences, a court is entitled to convict on circumstantial evidence alone. An accused cannot claim the benefit of doubt based on speculation; such doubt must rest upon a reasonable and solid foundation created either by positive evidence or reasonable inferences not in conflict with the proved facts. Where an accused deliberately gives false evidence, a court is justified in rejecting arguments that the accused should nevertheless receive benefits as if truthful evidence had been given (applying R v Mlambo and S v Steynberg).

The Court observed that the probabilities indicated that the appellant committed the murders on her own without assistance, although the trial court and majority in the full bench expressed doubt about whether the appellant delivered the fatal blows herself and thought she must have had assistance. The Court noted: 'Ek kan egter nie sien waarom daar op die getuienis sodanige twyfel moes wees nie' (However, I cannot see why there should have been such doubt on the evidence). The Court remarked that no neighbours saw any other persons, only one car similar to her father's was seen driving past without lights around the time of the murders (which was inconclusive), and police could find no trace of any third persons in or outside the house. The only evidence of other persons being involved in the murders came from the appellant herself, and she was found to be a liar. The Court also commented on the question of how the appellant could have ended up in the murder room standing within two metres of her mother when she was attacked, noting that if she was unaware of what was going to happen and entered the room due to other factors, one would expect her to immediately scream and flee upon seeing a person with an axe in her mother's room - which she did not do.

This case is significant for its application of the principles of circumstantial evidence in murder cases, particularly the test established in R v Blom. It illustrates how courts evaluate whether circumstantial evidence excludes all reasonable inferences except guilt. The case demonstrates the importance of an accused's conduct and false explanations in determining criminal liability. It also illustrates the distinction between being a principal perpetrator, a co-perpetrator who approves of criminal conduct, and an accessory after the fact. The judgment reinforces the principle from R v Mlambo that an accused who deliberately gives false evidence cannot expect to receive the benefit of a doubt that might otherwise exist. The case shows how courts analyze possibilities and probabilities in circumstantial evidence cases, particularly where the accused presents a false version of events.