The first applicant was a non-profit organisation based in Polokwane, Limpopo, dedicated to protecting human rights and access to justice. The second, third and fourth applicants were three affected residents of Malamulele, Limpopo. The applicants brought urgent proceedings in the High Court seeking a final interdict directing the respondents to immediately dispatch contractors to fix burst sewage pipelines in Section B, Malamulele. The individual applicants had reported the problem to Thulamela Municipality (the third respondent) on two consecutive days, but no action was taken. The applicants did not know which municipality was responsible for fixing the problem and did not inform Vhembe District Municipality (the first respondent) or the ward councillor before launching the urgent application. Vhembe opposed the application vigorously, stating that it only became aware of the problem when served with the court papers. Had the applicants informed it through normal channels, including a simple phone call, the problem would have been attended to within 48 hours. The High Court dismissed the application and ordered each of the applicants to pay Vhembe's costs jointly and severally on an attorney and client scale (punitive costs). The applicants sought direct leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court against both the dismissal and the punitive costs order.
1. Leave to appeal against the High Court's order dismissing the application is refused. 2. Leave to appeal is granted against the costs order in the High Court. 3. The appeal succeeds with costs. 4. The costs order in the High Court is set aside and replaced with: 'There is no order as to costs.'
In constitutional litigation between a private party and the state, the general rule is that no costs order should be made against an unsuccessful private litigant, unless the application is frivolous, vexatious or manifestly inappropriate. Whether an application is manifestly inappropriate depends on whether it was so unreasonable or out of line that it constitutes an abuse of the process of court. Punitive costs orders (on an attorney and client scale) should be reserved for cases of clear and indubitably vexatious and reprehensible conduct deserving extreme opprobrium. A High Court misdirects itself if it applies the ordinary costs rule (that costs follow the event) in constitutional litigation between a private party and the state without first considering whether the Biowatch principles apply. When a court misdirects itself in exercising its discretion on costs, an appellate court is entitled to interfere and reconsider the costs award. The character of the litigation and the conduct of the parties in pursuit of it are the relevant considerations, not merely whether the private party was unsuccessful.
The Court made several non-binding observations: (1) Social and economic rights enable citizens to hold government accountable and if one of the key goals is to ensure government is responsive and accountable through litigation, then that goal will be served when government takes responsive steps in litigation. (2) This points to a cooperative process in which government and citizen engage, if at all possible, before litigating. (3) Public interest groups should not be tempted to lower their ethical or professional standards in pursuit of a cause. (4) Parties should never be forced to be too careful to assert their constitutional rights through a court process for fear of a costs order. (5) The Court noted that residents in remote rural areas are often lamentably under-served by local and provincial government, which is a relevant consideration when considering whether to impose adverse costs orders. (6) It is generally accepted and proper legal practice to place a party on terms by way of a letter of demand before rushing to court, to avoid exacerbating the courts' tremendous workloads.
This case is significant in South African constitutional jurisprudence as it reinforces and clarifies the application of the Biowatch principles regarding costs in constitutional litigation between private parties and the state. The judgment emphasizes that the general rule is that no costs order should be made against an unsuccessful private litigant in constitutional litigation unless the application is frivolous, vexatious or manifestly inappropriate. The case provides important guidance on when punitive costs orders (on an attorney and client scale) may be awarded in constitutional litigation - only in cases of clear and indubitably vexatious and reprehensible conduct deserving extreme opprobrium. It serves as a warning to courts not to impose adverse costs orders lightly in constitutional matters, as this may have a chilling effect on the vindication of constitutional rights. The judgment also reinforces the importance of cooperative engagement between government and citizens before resorting to litigation in matters concerning socio-economic rights, while recognizing that genuine confusion or missteps by litigants (particularly those from under-resourced areas) warrant leniency rather than punishment through costs orders.
Explore 4 related cases • Click to navigate