Joseph Pule obo Public Servants Association of SA Department of Home Affairs Branch and Others v Public Servants Association and Others

The Public Servants Association (PSA) held its annual general meeting on 19 September 2019 where an election was held to fill five vacancies on the PSA's board. Three applicant branches of the PSA contested the election, challenging the number of spoilt votes recorded and demanding access to the ballot papers, which was refused. A special board meeting was scheduled for 9 October 2019. The applicants, being three branches of the PSA (Department of Home Affairs, Basic Education, and Science and Technology branches), sought interim relief in the form of an interdict restraining the PSA and its officials from convening further board meetings and filling the five vacancies pending a review application to set aside the election. The representatives of the branches approached the court in their representative capacities as national chairpersons of their respective branches, expressly disclaiming any personal interest in the matter and stating they acted in the collective interest of their branches and members. The PSA's statute established it as a legal persona and body corporate capable of suing and being sued, but contained no such provision for its branches. The PSA had not authorized the branches to institute the proceedings.

• Whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction under section 158(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act to entertain a dispute brought by branches of a trade union rather than by individual members of the union
• Whether branches of a trade union have legal personality and locus standi to institute proceedings in their own right
• Whether representatives of union branches acting in their representative capacities (as opposed to individual members acting in their personal capacities) can bring proceedings under section 158(1)(e) of the LRA
• Whether section 38 of the Constitution provides locus standi to union branches to approach the court
• Whether costs should be awarded against the individual representatives in their personal capacities

The application was dismissed. The representatives of the applicant branches (Messrs Pule, Malebye and Madikane) were ordered to pay the costs of the application in their personal capacities, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Section 158(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court only to determine disputes between a registered trade union and one or more of its individual members about non-compliance with the union's constitution; (2) Branches of a trade union, as internal structures, do not possess separate legal personality distinct from the union itself unless expressly conferred by the union's constitution or statute; (3) Internal structures of a trade union that lack separate legal personality do not have locus standi to institute proceedings in their own name or through their representatives acting in a representative capacity; (4) Where individuals approach a court in a representative capacity on behalf of a union branch rather than in their personal capacities as individual union members, they do not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of section 158(1)(e) of the LRA; and (5) The principle of subsidiarity precludes reliance on section 38 of the Constitution to establish standing where specific legislation provides mechanisms for the enforcement of rights, and in any event, section 38 requires an allegation that a Bill of Rights right has been infringed or threatened.

The court noted obiter that there is nothing to prevent any one or more individual members of the PSA from approaching the Labour Court in their personal capacities under section 158(1)(e) of the LRA to pursue any grievance related to alleged non-compliance with the PSA's constitution. This confirms that the jurisdictional defect could have been remedied had the applicants approached the court in their capacities as individual members rather than as representatives of branches. The court also observed that individual union members may not hide behind the structure of a union branch either to avoid the prospect of an adverse costs order or for the purpose of giving voice to a 'collective'. In relation to costs, the court exercised its discretion under section 162 of the LRA to award costs against the individual representatives personally, noting that fairness and the requirements of law justified this approach given that the applicants had been forewarned through correspondence that the PSA disputed their locus standi and the authority of the representatives to institute proceedings and incur legal costs, yet the applicants persisted with the application despite these warnings being repeated in the answering affidavit.

This case clarifies important principles concerning standing and jurisdiction in trade union disputes in South African labour law. It establishes that: (1) Section 158(1)(e) of the LRA confers jurisdiction on the Labour Court only to determine disputes between a trade union and its individual members, not disputes brought by internal structures such as branches; (2) Branches of trade unions do not possess separate legal personality unless expressly conferred by the union's constitution, and therefore lack locus standi to institute proceedings; (3) Individual members cannot circumvent the requirements of locus standi and potential costs liability by purporting to act in a representative capacity on behalf of union branches; (4) The principle of subsidiarity prevents litigants from relying directly on section 38 of the Constitution where specific legislation (such as the LRA) provides mechanisms for enforcing rights; and (5) Courts may award costs against individuals who persist with proceedings in their personal capacities after being warned about fundamental jurisdictional or standing defects. The judgment reinforces the distinction between the legal personality of a trade union as a whole and its internal structures, and emphasizes the importance of proper authorization and capacity when instituting legal proceedings.