The appellant, John Tutton, was convicted on 21 December 2007 in the Camperdown Regional Court of dealing in 8.1 tons of dagga (from June to August 2006) and 150 kg of cocaine (from September to October 2006), in contravention of s 5(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. He was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment on each count, with 10 years running concurrently, resulting in an effective sentence of 30 years. The trial court additionally imposed a non-parole period of 15 years under s 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, without notifying the appellant or inviting submissions on this issue. On appeal, the Full Court of the KwaZulu-Natal Division reduced the effective sentence to 25 years by directing that 15 years of the cocaine sentence run concurrently with the dagga sentence, but maintained the 15-year non-parole period. The appellant had served almost 11 years of his sentence by the time of this appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The appeal was upheld. The imposition of the 15-year non-parole period by the full court in terms of s 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was set aside. The matter was not remitted to the trial court.
A non-parole period imposed under s 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 should not be resorted to lightly and should only be imposed when circumstances specifically relevant to parole exist, in addition to any aggravating factors pertaining to the commission of the crime. Before imposing a non-parole period, a court must: (1) give notice to the accused of its intention to consider such an order; (2) invite and hear oral argument on the specific question; and (3) establish whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify the order. Failure to comply with these procedural requirements constitutes a misdirection. The fixing of a non-parole period is part of a criminal trial and, in accordance with the dictates of a fair trial, an accused person must be heard before such a period is fixed.
The court observed that courts should generally allow the parole board and officials in the Department of Correctional Services, who are guided by the Correctional Services Act and attendant regulations, to make parole assessments and decisions. This reflects the principle of separation of powers and recognizes that courts obtain their sentencing jurisdiction from statute. The court also noted that in determining whether to remit a matter to the trial court, considerations of fairness, equity, costs to the appellant, time already served, and delay are relevant factors. In this case, the court noted that referral would result in further costs and delays, and that the appellant had already served almost 11 years of his 25-year sentence, making it appropriate to finalize the matter rather than remit it.
This case reinforces important procedural safeguards in the imposition of non-parole periods under s 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act. It emphasizes that such orders should not be imposed lightly and requires courts to comply with principles of procedural fairness, including giving notice to the accused and affording an opportunity to be heard before making such orders. The judgment aligns with and applies the Constitutional Court's guidance in Jimmale v The State, contributing to the body of jurisprudence that respects the separation of powers between the judiciary and the Department of Correctional Services in parole matters. It demonstrates that non-parole periods are exceptional measures requiring specific justification beyond the ordinary aggravating factors considered in sentencing, and that failure to follow proper procedure constitutes a reviewable misdirection.
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