Graham Dick v Angela Christine Dick & Five Others

Mr Graham Dick (appellant) and Ms Angela Dick (first respondent) are a married couple in the process of divorcing. They were married by antenuptial contract in 1974 and built a substantial estate including a conglomerate of trading companies and several fixed properties. Three holiday homes are at the centre of this dispute: one in Mount Edgecombe (owned by 15 Grandhaven (Pty) Ltd), one in Pecanwood (owned by 262 Tawny Close (Pty) Ltd), and one in Somerset West (owned by 6 Peregrine Close (Pty) Ltd). These properties were used as vacation homes by the couple and their children. When the appellant arrived at the Mount Edgecombe property on 16 June 2006, he was met by two security guards stationed by Transman (Pty) Ltd (second respondent) who delivered a letter indicating his employment had been terminated, that Transman was now a tenant of the properties, and that he would have to pay R2000 per night to use them. The appellant claimed he had an agreement with Ms Dick and the companies for exclusive occupation of the properties and sought a final interdict to prevent Transman from interfering with his peaceful occupation of the three properties.

• Whether the appellant satisfied the requirements for a final interdict
• Whether an injury had actually been committed or was reasonably apprehended
• Whether there was unlawful interference with the appellant's use and enjoyment of the properties
• How to resolve disputes of fact in motion proceedings where matters have not been referred for oral evidence

The appeal was dismissed with costs, including the costs consequent upon the employment of two counsel where applicable.

To obtain a final interdict, an applicant must prove: (1) the existence of a clear right; (2) that an injury has actually been committed or is reasonably apprehended; and (3) the absence of any other satisfactory remedy. Where there is a material dispute of fact in motion proceedings that has not been referred for oral evidence, the Plascon Evans principle applies and the applicant will fail if the respondent's version cannot be rejected as far-fetched or untenable. An applicant for an interdict cannot succeed where the allegations of interference or threatened interference are substantially disputed and watered down between the founding and replying affidavits, and where there is no credible evidence of actual or reasonably apprehended injury.

The court noted that relief in respect of the Erinvale property ought not to have been sought at all, much less persisted with before the Supreme Court of Appeal, given the concession that there had been no interference or threatened interference with that property. This suggests that applicants should exercise proper judgment in tailoring their claims to actual grievances and should not pursue relief where there is clearly no factual basis for it.

This case reinforces the strict requirements for obtaining a final interdict in South African law, particularly the requirement that an injury must have actually been committed or be reasonably apprehended. It demonstrates the application of the Plascon Evans principle in interdict proceedings - where there is a material dispute of fact on the papers and the matter has not been referred for oral evidence, the court must accept the respondent's version unless it is so far-fetched or untenable that it can be rejected. The case also illustrates that applicants for interdicts must maintain consistent allegations and cannot succeed where their claims are substantially weakened or contradicted between founding and replying papers. It serves as a reminder that relief should not be sought where there is no evidence of actual or threatened interference.