On 16 January 2017, the High Court granted a provisional order under case HC 12931/16 interdicting the applicant from carrying out mining activities within prohibited distances from the first respondent's permanent structures and borehole, and from threatening the first respondent's employees. The applicant had been operating mining claims on Flaxton Estate (Countess 9) under a tribute agreement 52/13 which expired in June 2016. After the provisional order was granted, the applicant regularized his mining operations and obtained a Certificate of Registration after Transfer (TR8497, registration number 4569) on 10 March 2017. The mining claim had originally been registered on 25 June 2001. The parties attempted to engage each other to resolve the matter amicably as urged by Justice Chitapi who granted the provisional order, but these attempts failed. On 16 March 2017, the applicant filed a chamber application for discharge of the provisional order on the basis of material changes in circumstances.
1) The provisional order and interim relief issued on 16 January 2017 was discharged. 2) The applicant was allowed to operate his mining claims at Flaxton Estate, commonly known as Countess 9 (registered number 4569, registered on 25 June 2001) freely without undue interference from any members/directors of the first respondent. 3) The prohibition imposed against the applicant by the interim order was uplifted forthwith. 4) The first respondent was ordered to pay costs of the application.
A provisional order may be discharged on good cause shown where there are material changes in circumstances that render the interim relief oppressive and unjustified. Where a provisional order specifically authorizes a party to make a chamber application for discharge or alteration on good cause shown, that party is entitled to utilize that procedure and cannot be faulted for doing so. The regularization of previously irregular operations constitutes a material change in circumstances that justifies discharge of an interim order that was granted due to those irregularities. An interim order must remain necessary and proportionate to the circumstances; once the mischief it was designed to prevent has been addressed, the order should be discharged.
The court observed that if the first respondent had cooperated with the applicant in their attempts at engagement, the chamber application for discharge would not have been necessary or filed when it was filed. The court also noted, without deciding the point definitively, that while the second respondent's submission suggested that paragraph 8 of the provisional order referred to when the matter could be heard rather than to the discharge application, the clear lack of cooperation from the first respondent justified the applicant's actions. The court implicitly recognized that self-represented litigants should not be prejudiced when following procedures authorized by court orders, even if more experienced practitioners might interpret those orders differently.
This case demonstrates the importance of material changes in circumstances as grounds for discharge of interim orders in Zimbabwean law. It clarifies that when a provisional order specifically authorizes a chamber application for discharge, parties cannot be faulted for utilizing that procedure. The case also emphasizes that interim relief must remain necessary and justified - once the underlying concerns are addressed (in this case through regularization of mining operations), the interim order should be discharged. It further illustrates the court's practical approach to inter-party negotiations where one party fails to cooperate, rejecting the 'dirty hands' argument in such circumstances.