G4S Cash Solutions, a cash-in-transit business, employed the individual first respondents as custodians tasked with replenishing ATMs for clients such as Capitec Bank. Between January and June 2019, cash shortages totalling R1 377 690 occurred on the routes assigned to these employees. After the employees were removed from those routes (July to December 2019), the shortages dropped by approximately 90% to R134 270. Following internal investigations and polygraph tests indicating deception, each employee was individually charged with gross negligence for failing to account for the cash shortages and dismissed between August 2019 and January 2020. NUMSA referred unfair dismissal disputes to the National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry. The arbitrator found the dismissals both substantively and procedurally unfair and ordered retrospective reinstatement with back pay. G4S launched a review application in terms of section 145 read with section 158(1)(g) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The review was filed on 13 October 2022, which was within time as the final variation award was only served on 31 August 2022. In the arbitration, the employees conceded the shortages existed but denied any duty or responsibility to account for them, and only two of the nine employees testified.
The arbitration award (and its variation rulings) was reviewed and set aside. The review application succeeded. (The final operative paragraphs of the judgment containing any consequential order—such as remittal or substitution—are truncated in the provided text, but the summary on the first page confirms the award was reviewed and set aside.)
1. Under section 145 read with section 158(1)(g) of the LRA, an arbitration award is reviewable on the ground of unreasonableness if the arbitrator committed a material error or irregularity and the outcome, viewed against all the evidence and issues, is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not have reached. 2. Unfair dismissal arbitration is a hearing de novo, but an employer is bound by the true reason for dismissal advanced at the time of dismissal; additional evidence at arbitration must relate to that same reason, and the employer may not rely on a different or morphed justification. 3. Disciplinary charges need not be formulated with criminal-law precision. The true reason for dismissal is determined contextually from the charge sheet, the disciplinary hearing, and the surrounding circumstances, and an arbitrator errs by confining the enquiry to a narrow, literal reading of the charge wording. 4. Where an employer establishes a prima facie case that losses occurred while an employee had sole custody and control of entrusted property, the onus shifts to the employee to provide a reasonable and acceptable explanation; failure to do so supports an inference of negligence, and depending on the degree of remissness and the seriousness of the consequences, may amount to gross negligence. 5. An arbitrator commits a reviewable irregularity by applying a 'reasonable doubt' standard rather than determining the matter on the balance of inherent probabilities. 6. A finding of inconsistency in the application of discipline requires proof of a proper like-for-like comparison on the facts; absent such a basis, the finding is unreasonable and reviewable. 7. A finding of procedural unfairness must be supported by evidence of prejudice or irregularity; where employees fully participated in the process without objection, such a finding is unreasonable.
The Court's opening remarks criticising the parties for submitting an unnecessarily voluminous review record spanning thousands of pages across approximately 30 lever arch files, when the matter was relatively straightforward, and its observation that parties have a duty to provide only what is needed to decide the review and that the bulkiest applications often involve the simplest matters. The detailed description of the cash-in-transit industry's chain of custody and security protocols, while providing important factual context, was not strictly necessary for the legal principles decided.
The judgment is significant because it reaffirms the Sidumo reasonableness standard for the review of arbitration awards under section 145 of the LRA. It clarifies the limits of the de novo nature of unfair dismissal arbitration: while employers may lead fresh evidence, they cannot alter or amend the true reason for dismissal given at the time of dismissal. It reinforces that workplace disciplinary charges must be interpreted contextually rather than with criminal-law technicality, and that arbitrators act unreasonably when they adopt an unduly narrow reading of charges that excludes relevant evidence. The case also establishes important principles for cases involving entrusted property: where an employer proves on a prima facie basis that losses occurred under an employee's sole control, the employee bears a duty to provide a reasonable explanation, and an unexplained failure to account may justify a finding of gross negligence. Finally, it warns arbitrators against applying a criminal 'reasonable doubt' standard instead of deciding matters on a balance of inherent probabilities.