Farai Rwodzi and Christopher Sambaza v Deposit Protection Corporation (in its capacity as Liquidator of Interfin Bank Limited (under Liquidation)) and Others

The two applicants (Rwodzi and Sambaza) were sued jointly and severally with the 2nd to 12th respondents by the 1st respondent (Deposit Protection Corporation as liquidator of Interfin Bank Limited) for payment of US$136,097,897.09. The applicants received summons and on 18 November 2016 requested further particulars from the 1st respondent, claiming the declaration was inadequate to enable them to plead. The 1st respondent supplied particulars on 20 June 2017, after significant delay. The applicants considered these inadequate and requested further and better particulars. When the 1st respondent refused, the applicants filed this application to compel provision of further and better particulars. The 1st respondent's declaration alleged that the applicants, as directors of the bank, breached fiduciary duties, failed to inject capital resulting in negative capital of US$5,876,089.00 as at 31 March 2010, failed to supervise lending activities, allowed improper payments, and engaged in fraudulent conduct. The declaration used vague phrases like "at all material times" covering a 13-year period and made serious allegations without specifying dates, amounts, parties involved, or precise nature of alleged misconduct.

• Whether the request for further and better particulars was made timeously under Order 21 Rule 142(b) of the High Court Rules 1971
• Whether a party can request further and better particulars to previously supplied particulars or whether this constitutes an impermissible repetition
• Whether the 1st respondent's declaration contained sufficient particulars to enable the applicants to plead a defence
• What standard of specificity is required in pleadings, particularly where serious allegations of fraud, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are made
• Whether the use of vague temporal phrases like 'at all material times' renders pleadings ambiguous and inadequate

1. The 1st Respondent shall supply the further particulars requested by the 1st and 2nd Applicants within ten (10) days of the service of this order. 2. 1st Respondent shall pay the costs of suit.

The binding legal principles established are: (1) Under Order 21 Rules 137(1)(d) and 141(b) of the High Court Rules 1971, a party may request further and better particulars to previously supplied particulars if those particulars remain inadequate, provided the party is not requesting new particulars on issues not initially requested; (2) The time limit under Rule 142(b) for making a court application after refusal to supply particulars is twelve days from the date of refusal; (3) Pleadings must state facts in clear and concise terms to enable the opposing party to reasonably and fairly plead in response and to enable the court to isolate the issues for adjudication; (4) Where serious allegations such as fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, or unlawful conduct are made, the pleadings must specify: the precise period when the alleged conduct occurred, the specific acts or omissions complained of, the parties involved, the amounts in question, and other material details necessary to enable a defendant to plead; (5) Vague temporal references covering extensive periods (such as "at all material times" spanning 13 years) render pleadings ambiguous and inadequate; (6) A plaintiff who has exclusive possession of information necessary for a defendant to plead (such as a bank liquidator with access to all bank records) must provide sufficient particulars of that information to enable the defendant to prepare a defense.

TAGU J made important non-binding observations about the standard of pleadings generally expected in the High Court. The court endorsed and adopted the remarks of MATHONSI J in Fungai Nhau v Memory Kipe HH-73-15 criticizing long, winding and argumentative pleadings and urging legal practitioners to read the law before drafting pleadings. The court associated itself with the sentiments of MAKARAU JP (as she then was) in Chifamba v Mutasa HH-16/08 that legal practitioners must understand what the law requires their clients to prove before drafting pleadings. TAGU J observed that "Litigation in the High Court is serious business and the standard of pleadings in the court must reflect such." These comments, while not necessary for the decision, serve as guidance and admonishment to the legal profession regarding the quality of pleadings submitted to the High Court. The court also noted that pleadings must identify the branch of law under which the claim or defense is made and should not contain evidence - distinguishing between facts to be pleaded and evidence to be led at trial.

This case is significant for establishing standards for pleadings in Zimbabwean civil procedure, particularly in complex banking and commercial litigation. It reinforces that: (1) parties may make multiple requests for further particulars if initial responses are inadequate; (2) vague temporal references like "at all material times" covering extensive periods are insufficient in pleadings; (3) serious allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and financial misconduct must be particularized with specific dates, amounts, parties, and nature of alleged wrongdoing; (4) where a plaintiff has exclusive access to information necessary for a defendant to plead (such as bank records in the hands of a liquidator), that information must be disclosed through particulars; (5) the standard for pleadings requires clarity, conciseness and sufficient detail to enable the opposing party to prepare a defense and the court to identify the issues for adjudication. The case serves as a reminder to legal practitioners of their duty to draft proper pleadings and not submit long, winding, argumentative or vague pleadings to the court.