Elizabeth Catherina Steyn NO v Ronald Bobroff & Partners

On 28 August 2005, the appellant's minor son (Micah) sustained a fractured skull in a motor vehicle accident. On 17 March 2006, the appellant instructed the respondent, a firm of attorneys advertising themselves as specialists in personal injury claims, to institute a third-party claim against the Road Accident Fund (RAF). The parties entered into three written agreements mandating the respondent to investigate, process, lodge and prosecute the claim to finality. The respondent lodged the claim with the RAF on 27 February 2007 (approximately 7 months after it could have been lodged on 30 July 2006). When the Fund failed to respond, summons was issued and served on 12 December 2007. The matter proceeded to trial on 1-5 February 2010, with judgment delivered on 11 February 2010 awarding R500,000 for general damages and R2,060,099 for future loss of earnings. During the processing of the claim, Micah underwent numerous medical tests including EEG, CT scan, and MRI which revealed abnormalities and a brain tumor requiring urgent surgery on 28 June 2006. The appellant terminated the respondent's mandate in October 2009 and instructed new attorneys, without ever complaining to the respondent about delays. Five days after the successful judgment, on 16 February 2010, the appellant sued the respondent claiming R479,485.20 representing interest she allegedly lost on the capital sum over a 14-month delay period, calculated at the prescribed rate of 15.5% per annum.

• Whether the claim against the respondent attorneys was based in contract or delict
• Whether the respondent breached the written mandate by delaying the claim by 14 months
• Whether the respondent failed to exercise the standard of diligence, care and skill reasonably expected of a practising attorney, or alternatively of a 'pre-eminent specialist' personal injury attorney
• Whether the appellant was required to adduce expert evidence to establish the standard of care expected of a reasonable attorney in similar circumstances
• Whether the appellant could claim mora interest at the prescribed rate of 15.5% as damages when the respondent did not owe her a debt
• Whether the appellant properly quantified her damages and proved actual loss

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

An attorney's duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence must be assessed against the specific circumstances, complexity and nature of each case. What constitutes a 'reasonable time' for finalizing a matter cannot be determined in the abstract but depends on factors including the nature and extent of injuries, required investigations, and complexity of the claim. Where a claim against an attorney is based on alleged breach of written mandate agreements, the claim is contractual, not delictual. In the absence of expert evidence establishing what a reasonable attorney would have done in similar circumstances, a plaintiff cannot establish professional negligence merely by proving some delay occurred. The prescribed rate of interest under the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act applies only to mora interest ancillary to a principal debt. Where an attorney is not a debtor but is sued for damages for alleged breach of mandate, the claimant must prove actual loss including what would have been done with money and what return would have been earned; the prescribed interest rate does not automatically apply as a measure of damages.

Bosielo JA provided historical context on the evolution of the attorney's profession, noting how it transformed from being considered 'infamissima vilitas' in ancient times to becoming 'an indispensable adjunct to everyone' in modern society, as described in Van Zyl's The Judicial Practice of South Africa. The court emphasized that the attorney's profession has become more diverse and sophisticated over time, making De Villiers CJ's observations in Van der Spuy v Pillans 1875 Buch 133 about attorney liability for negligence even more apt today. Brand JA made broader observations about the fundamental misconception in using mora interest calculations where no principal debt exists, warning that this flawed premise 'may perpetuate and snare future litigants in the same trap' unless attention is called to it. He explained the historical and conceptual foundations of mora interest as 'belangende het gene aan de principale saak toevallig is' (ancillary or accessory to the principal obligation) and contrasted this with interest as a component in damage calculations, citing the distinction articulated by Fagan JA in Union Government v Jackson 1956 (2) SA 398 (A) and applied in Crookes Brothers Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commission [2012] ZASCA 128.

This case clarifies important principles in South African law regarding: (1) The distinction between contractual and delictual claims against attorneys, confirming that where written mandates exist and the complaint concerns breach of contractual duties to perform professional work with due diligence, the claim is contractual not delictual (following Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A)). (2) The standard of care expected of attorneys - they must exercise diligence, care and skill, but this standard is assessed relative to the complexity, circumstances and nature of each case. A reasonable delay must be determined contextually, not in the abstract. (3) The necessity of expert evidence to establish professional negligence - absent expert testimony about what a reasonable attorney would have done in similar circumstances, a plaintiff cannot establish breach of the professional standard of care merely by showing some delay occurred. (4) The critical distinction between mora interest (accessory to a principal debt) and interest as a component in calculating damages for breach of contract. The prescribed rate under the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 applies only to the former. Where no debt is owed, a claimant must prove actual loss through evidence of what would have been done with the money and what return would have been earned. (5) The professional duties of attorneys as articulated from historical principles - attorneys are liable for negligence and want of skill when they fail to bestow sufficient care and attention to business entrusted to them, but this must be proven, not presumed.