The applicant was an unincorporated voluntary association of approximately 26 residents of Ogies who sought interim relief against three coal mining companies (Glencore, Anglo-American, and South 32) conducting open cast mining operations within a 10 km radius of the town. The application was withdrawn against the second and third respondents. The applicant alleged that Glencore's mining operations at Tweefontein and Goedgevonden mines (9 km and 1.5 km from town respectively) created a nuisance through: (1) blasting activities creating vibrations, fear and trauma; (2) air and dust pollution causing increased respiratory illnesses; (3) loud warning sirens; and (4) water pollution and contamination affecting the mosque and madrasah. The applicant initially sought to halt all mining operations within 10 km but later amended the relief to seek specific measures including: reducing blasting below 125 dB; installing monitoring equipment; restricting blasting hours; installing dust suppression technology; and providing fresh drinking water. This was Part A of a two-part application, with Part B being a review application seeking to set aside the Minister of Mineral Resources' decision to grant mining rights.
The first respondent's (Glencore's) late filing of its answering affidavit was condoned. The application was dismissed with costs.
In nuisance claims arising from mining operations, a plaintiff must prove material and substantial interference with the right to enjoyment of property using an objective 'reasonable person' test. Factors to be considered include the type, degree and persistence of the disturbance, the locality, and timing. Isolated or marginal breaches of statutory environmental limits (4 exceedances out of approximately 53 blasts over 4 months, exceeding limits by only 0.7%) do not constitute the regular and persistent abuse required for an actionable nuisance, particularly where ground vibrations and dustfall levels remain well within prescribed limits. Living in proximity to lawful mining operations requires tolerating some discomfort, provided the operations remain within regulatory parameters and do not amount to material and unreasonable interference. The persistence and repetitive character of encroachment must be considered relative to the period over which the possibility of encroachment exists.
The court noted that various enforcement mechanisms exist under environmental legislation (the Air Quality Act, NEMA, the National Water Act, and the MPRDA) through which statutory functionaries could hold mining companies to account for compliance with environmental obligations. The court observed that these alternative remedies might preclude a party from seeking interdictory relief based on common law nuisance, but expressly stated it was not necessary to decide this issue given the dismissal on the merits. The court also observed that if air pollution were attributable to all three mining companies in the area, it would be difficult to see how Glencore alone could prevent the harm. The judgment also commented on the inadequacy of Greyling's purported expert evidence, noting he provided no methodology or validation of his experience, and his assessment of blast forces as equivalent to 7 on the Richter scale appeared wildly exaggerated compared to earthquakes that caused actual devastation at lower levels.
This case clarifies the application of the common law of nuisance in the context of modern mining operations near residential areas. It demonstrates the court's approach to balancing mining rights with community welfare, emphasizing that: (1) not all inconvenience from neighboring land use is actionable - there must be material and substantial interference; (2) compliance with statutory environmental limits is a significant factor in determining whether a nuisance exists; (3) the test is objective, not based on individual sensitivity; (4) persistence and regularity of the interference are key elements; (5) scientific evidence and expert monitoring data carry substantial weight over subjective complaints. The judgment also illustrates the standard for evaluating expert evidence in motion proceedings and the importance of current, methodology-based expert opinions rather than outdated or speculative assessments. It raises (but does not decide) important questions about the interaction between common law remedies and statutory environmental enforcement mechanisms under NEMA, the Air Quality Act, the National Water Act, and the MPRDA.