TMT Services & Supplies (Pty) Ltd t/a Traffic Management Technologies v MEC: Department of Transport, Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others

The Department of Transport in KwaZulu-Natal published Tender ZNB1366/17T in 2017 for an integrated traffic contravention management system. Four entities responded. TMT Services & Supplies (Pty) Ltd (TMT), based in Cape Town, was excluded at an early stage. The Head of Department awarded the tender to MTM KZN Traffix (Pty) Ltd (Traffix), which was domiciled in KwaZulu-Natal. Another unsuccessful bidder launched review proceedings which were later withdrawn. TMT then launched review proceedings in the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town. The respondents raised a point in limine that the Western Cape court lacked jurisdiction. Ndita J declined to exercise jurisdiction, effectively holding that the matter should have been brought in the KwaZulu-Natal Division. TMT appealed.

• Whether the Western Cape High Court had jurisdiction to review the administrative decision to award the tender
• Whether the definition of 'court' in section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) exclusively determines jurisdiction for review of administrative action
• Whether section 21(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 applies to limit or supplement PAJA's jurisdictional provisions
• Whether a court with jurisdiction under PAJA may decline to exercise that jurisdiction on grounds of convenience
• Whether TMT's choice to institute proceedings in the Western Cape High Court constituted an abuse of process
• Whether section 6 of PAJA vests a discretion in courts to decline jurisdiction

The appeal was upheld with costs. The order of the court below was set aside and replaced with an order dismissing the point in limine that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, with costs. The matter was remitted to the Western Cape High Court for determination of the remaining issues and the merits of the review application.

The definition of 'court' in section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 exclusively and completely determines which courts have jurisdiction to review administrative action. Section 21(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 does not apply to supplement or limit the jurisdictional provisions of PAJA. The jurisdictional bases set out in section 1 of PAJA are unqualified and apply without additional requirements of convenience, effectiveness or common sense. Where more than one court has jurisdiction under PAJA, the applicant is entitled to choose the forum. A court that has jurisdiction under PAJA has no power to decline to exercise that jurisdiction, save in cases of abuse of process. The mere exercise of a lawful choice of forum does not constitute abuse of process. Section 6 of PAJA does not vest a discretion in courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction validly established under the Act.

The Court observed that PAJA was enacted to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution and is a codification of constitutional rights to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action. Matters concerning interpretation and application of PAJA are constitutional matters. As such, constitutional rights should not be cut down by reading implicit restrictions into them to bring them into line with common law. The Court noted that the origin of the ordinary residence/domicile and location of adverse effect grounds for jurisdiction (from Estate Agents Board v Lek) was expressly intended to give effect to access to court - a purpose that would be undermined by restricting those grounds. The Court observed that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply in South African law (save in admiralty matters), and courts are not entitled to decline to hear cases properly brought before them. The Court indicated that if a respondent believes a choice of forum works hardship, the appropriate remedy is an application for transfer under section 27 of the Superior Courts Act, not a challenge to jurisdiction. The Court commented that PAJA contemplates the possible future establishment of specialist administrative tribunals, though there appear to be no current plans for such tribunals.

This judgment provides authoritative guidance on jurisdiction in administrative law reviews under PAJA. It establishes that the definition of 'court' in section 1 of PAJA is the exclusive and complete test for determining which courts have jurisdiction to review administrative action. General jurisdictional provisions in the Superior Courts Act do not supplement or limit PAJA's jurisdictional provisions. The judgment affirms broad access to justice by recognizing multiple jurisdictional bases (where action occurred, administrator's principal place of administration, applicant's domicile/ordinary residence, or where adverse effect experienced) and confirming applicants' right to choose forum where concurrent jurisdiction exists. It clarifies that courts cannot decline jurisdiction on grounds of convenience - such issues must be addressed through transfer applications under section 27 of the Superior Courts Act. The judgment reinforces the principle that PAJA, as legislation giving effect to constitutional rights under section 33, should be interpreted generously to promote rather than restrict access to administrative justice. It also provides important guidance on concurrent jurisdiction and abuse of process in the administrative law context.