Michael Hattingh and Others v Laurence Edward Juta

Mrs Magrieta Hattingh (aged 67, poor health) worked as a housekeeper for Mr Juta. In December 2002, she and her husband moved to Mr Juta's smallholding (Fijnbosch) with his consent. The three applicants (her two adult sons and daughter-in-law) also came to live in the cottage at about the same time. Mrs Hattingh stopped working for Mr Juta after December 2005 but continued to live in the cottage. Her husband passed away in 2006. Mr Juta allowed Mrs Hattingh to remain but expected the adult children (applicants) to vacate. When they did not, he instituted eviction proceedings. The applicants were employed and earning income but had been on a government housing waiting list for years. Mr Juta needed the cottage to accommodate his farm manager who was cycling 16 km daily.

• What is the scope and meaning of the right to 'family life in accordance with the culture of that family' in section 6(2)(d) of ESTA?
• Does the term 'family' in section 6(2)(d) include adult, independent children or is it limited to spouse and dependent children?
• How should the balancing exercise required by section 6(2) between the occupier's rights and the landowner's rights be conducted?
• Would eviction of the adult children infringe Mrs Hattingh's right to family life under ESTA?

Leave to appeal granted. Application to admit new evidence dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Order of Supreme Court of Appeal varied only to extend eviction dates to 13 June 2013 (for applicants to vacate) and 14 June 2013 (for sheriff intervention if necessary). No order as to costs.

The right to family life in section 6(2)(d) of ESTA is not limited to nuclear family (spouse and dependent children) but can include extended family members including adult children. However, the extent of this right in any case depends on balancing the occupier's right to family life against the landowner's rights in a manner that is just and equitable. The phrase 'balanced with the rights of the owner or person in charge' in section 6(2) requires a justice and equity inquiry taking into account all relevant factors. An occupier's right to live with family members will be limited where the balance of factors demonstrates it would not be just and equitable for those family members to remain, even if they fall within the concept of 'family'.

The Court observed that ESTA is part of a broader legislative movement towards infusing justice and equity into legal relationships that were previously characterized by inequality, citing similar developments in labour law (unfair dismissal), unlawful occupation (PIE), landlord-tenant relations (Rental Housing Act), and consumer relations. Zondo J noted that families 'come in different shapes and sizes' (citing Dawood) and that there is no need to define 'family' with precision beyond stating it cannot be limited to nuclear family. The Court also noted that the purpose of section 6(2)(d) was to ensure occupiers (a vulnerable group denied rights under apartheid) could live as normal a family life as possible on others' land, restoring human dignity. The Court addressed the 'family life by ambush' concern by explaining that the balancing requirement protects landowners from unlimited family members claiming residence rights.

This is the first Constitutional Court judgment interpreting section 6(2)(d) of ESTA, providing authoritative guidance on the right to family life for land occupiers. The judgment establishes important principles: (1) 'family' under ESTA is not limited to nuclear family; (2) the right to family life must be balanced against landowner's rights through a justice and equity inquiry; (3) ESTA forms part of post-apartheid legislation infusing fairness into previously unequal relationships; (4) the judgment provides a framework for balancing competing rights in eviction cases involving occupiers' family members; (5) it clarifies that adult, independent children can be part of an occupier's family life, but their continued residence depends on the justice and equity balancing exercise. The case reflects the constitutional transformation of land tenure relationships and the protection of vulnerable occupiers while recognizing landowners' legitimate rights.