The fourth and fifth respondents (Alester and Miriam Ziyanga) operated a tobacco farm (Una farm) in Hwedza under the name of the third respondent (Alagonia Farming). They contracted to grow 84 hectares of tobacco for the second respondent (Northern Tobacco), which agreed to provide financial support. A dispute arose between these parties. The applicant (Bright Ziyanga, a relative of the fourth and fifth respondents) claimed that 35 hectares of the 84 hectares were actually grown by him for the first respondent (Tian Ze Tobacco). When the second respondent filed an urgent application in HC 9919/13 regarding the 84 hectares of tobacco, it did not join the applicant or first respondent. At the hearing, the applicant sought to be joined as an interested party but was either refused or the court reserved its ruling on joinder. The court then granted the order sought by the second respondent. The applicant subsequently filed for rescission of that judgment and now sought an interim stay of execution.
The court granted a stay of execution in modified form: "Pending the final determination of the application for the rescission of judgment in case number HC 9919/13, the execution of the order in case number HC 9919/13 be and is hereby stayed." The court declined to grant the second part of the order directing the Registrar to set down the rescission application.
Where a party claims that an order was granted affecting their property rights without affording them an opportunity to be heard, this constitutes a prima facie infringement of the constitutional right to a fair hearing. Even if the right is not clearly established on the papers, if it is prima facie established together with irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favours the applicant, an interim stay of execution should be granted pending determination of the rescission application. An applicant cannot obtain relief against a party (such as the Registrar) who has not been joined to the proceedings.
The court observed that the second respondent may have failed to appreciate the full consequences of disregarding legal advice to join the first respondent and applicant in the original proceedings. The court expressed doubt that even if the second respondent had joined them, it would not have succeeded in obtaining the relief it sought in HC 9919/13. The court noted that there were unsatisfactory features in the form of the draft order as pointed out by counsel, but held these did not detract from the applicant's entitlement to relief.
This case affirms the principle that constitutional rights to a fair hearing must be protected even at the interim stage of proceedings. It demonstrates the court's willingness to grant interim relief where a party's right to be heard may have been infringed, pending final determination of the substantive application. The case also illustrates the proper application of the established test for interim interdicts in Zimbabwean law, emphasizing that a prima facie right (though open to doubt) combined with irreparable harm and balance of convenience can justify interim relief. It reinforces procedural fairness requirements and the need to join all affected parties in litigation concerning their property rights.