The Standard Bank sued Beulah Bonugli (both personally and as trustee of Rivonia Close Trust) and Christopher Bonugli (as trustee of RCT) for payment of R16,958,969 based on a deed of suretyship guaranteeing debts of Union Charter Trust (UCT) under four aircraft leases. UCT's indebtedness arose from leases for Pilatus PC12 aircraft concluded in Johannesburg. UCT was subsequently sequestrated. The general guarantee was executed on 22 April 1998 in which RCT and Mrs Bonugli undertook liability as sureties for all UCT debts. The bank repossessed and sold the aircraft in May 2006. At the time of litigation, Mr Bonugli was permanently resident in Sydney, Australia. The leases and suretyship were concluded in Johannesburg. Both trustees had provided the Master with an address within the Western Cape jurisdiction in terms of section 5 of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988.
Appeal upheld with costs including two counsel. The trial court order was set aside and substituted with judgment in favor of Standard Bank for R14,578,143 (reduced from R16,958,969) plus interest at 15.5% per annum from service of summons, and costs including two counsel. Costs of appeal limited to 10% for preparation, perusal and copying of the record due to unnecessary inclusion of voluminous material.
The ratio decidendi includes: (1) A defendant who opposes summary judgment solely on the merits without challenging the court's jurisdiction submits to that jurisdiction by conduct. Rule 32(3)(b) assumes jurisdiction and does not excuse failure to raise jurisdictional objections. (2) When a trustee invokes a court's jurisdiction for relief (such as defending an action on the merits) without objecting to jurisdiction, this constitutes submission to jurisdiction by the trust. (3) By permitting an appearance and filing an affidavit opposing summary judgment dealing solely with merits, a peregrinus trustee submits to jurisdiction. (4) Charges claimed under a contract must fall within the express contractual terms; expenses not falling within 'costs of sale' or 'return of goods' provisions are not recoverable. (5) Credibility findings by trial courts on contested factual issues such as rectification will not be disturbed on appeal absent compelling reason.
The court made several obiter observations: (1) It noted that exercising jurisdiction over a peregrinus in a representative capacity may require development of the law regarding attachment of property, but did not decide this issue given the finding of submission. (2) The court expressed strong disapproval of counsel's failure to comply with Rule 10A(a)(ix) requiring indication of necessary portions of the record, noting that approximately 90% of the 2,190-page record was unnecessary. The court referenced Van Aardt v Galway and warned that future non-compliance may result in punitive costs orders or deprivation of counsel's fees. The court spared counsel censure only because the Van Aardt judgment was delivered after their heads were filed. (3) The court noted in passing the differences between partnerships and trusts in the context of jurisdiction, though finding support in partnership principles for considerations of convenience. (4) The court observed that trusts lack legal personality and can only act through trustees who must be cited in their representative capacity.
This case is significant for clarifying the principles of submission to jurisdiction in South African civil procedure, particularly: (1) the distinction between jurisdictional competence and merits defenses in summary judgment applications; (2) confirmation that opposing summary judgment on the merits without challenging jurisdiction constitutes submission to jurisdiction, even for peregrini; (3) application of jurisdiction principles to trusts and trustees in their representative capacity; (4) the importance of compliance with Rule 10A(a)(ix) regarding indicating necessary portions of the record for appeal; (5) principles governing interpretation of suretyship agreements and recovery of charges under lease agreements. The judgment reinforces that failure to raise jurisdictional objections when opposing summary judgment on the merits amounts to waiver of such objections and submission to the court's jurisdiction.