Boler v. Earley and Mays v. Snyder

This is a consolidated appeal arising from the Flint, Michigan water contamination crisis. Between 1967 and 2014, Flint sourced its water from Lake Huron via the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department. In 2013, Flint decided to join a new water supplier (KWA) that was under construction. When the current supplier terminated the contract, Flint needed an interim water source. In April 2014, Flint's emergency manager switched the water source to the Flint River without implementing required anti-corrosive treatment measures, despite a 2011 report warning that such treatment was necessary. Following the switch, residents immediately complained about the water quality. Testing revealed coliform, E. coli bacteria, high lead levels, and other contaminants. The water was linked to Legionnaire's disease. General Motors stopped using the water due to corrosion. Despite warnings from the EPA and others, officials continued to bill residents for contaminated water and overruled the City Council's attempt to reconnect to the former supplier. In October 2015, an emergency was declared and Flint reconnected to the previous supplier, but damage to pipes continued to affect water quality. The Michigan Civil Rights Commission later found that the response to the crisis was "the result of systemic racism." Plaintiffs, Flint residents and businesses, brought class action lawsuits alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including violations of the Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, as well as claims under § 1985 and various state law claims. Defendants included state officials (Governor Snyder, state departments), emergency managers, local officials, and the City of Flint.

• Whether the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) precludes § 1983 claims for constitutional violations arising from the Flint water crisis
• Whether the SDWA's remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to foreclose § 1983 remedies for constitutional claims
• Whether the substantive rights protected by the SDWA diverge significantly from constitutional protections under the Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause
• Whether Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars claims against the State of Michigan and state officials
• Whether state defendants waived sovereign immunity through their conduct in litigation
• Whether the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies to allow prospective injunctive relief against the Governor

The Sixth Circuit REVERSED the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1983 claims as precluded by the SDWA. The court AFFIRMED dismissal of claims against the State of Michigan in both cases and against MDEQ, MDHHS, and Governor Snyder in Boler based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Claims against Governor Snyder in Mays survived under the Ex Parte Young exception. The court REMANDED for further proceedings, declining to address alternative grounds for dismissal (Rule 12(b)(6), qualified immunity, etc.) that should be considered by the district court in the first instance. Claims against municipal defendants (City of Flint, emergency managers, local officials) remain viable as municipalities do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The binding legal principle is that the Safe Drinking Water Act does not preclude § 1983 claims for violations of constitutional rights such as the Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause. When determining whether a federal statute precludes § 1983 claims based on constitutional violations, courts must examine: (1) the statutory text and legislative history for express or implicit evidence of congressional intent to displace constitutional remedies; (2) whether the statute's remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate such intent; and (3) whether the substantive rights and protections of the statute and Constitution diverge significantly. Where, as with the SDWA: the statute contains no textual or legislative history indication of intent to foreclose constitutional claims; the remedial scheme is limited (providing only injunctive relief, not damages) and includes a savings clause preserving other remedies; and the substantive protections diverge significantly (statutory claims require only showing regulatory violations without intent, while constitutional claims require showing intentional discrimination, deliberate indifference, or other specific constitutional standards), the statute does not preclude § 1983 remedies. The defendant bears the burden of proving preclusion, and courts should not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude § 1983 remedies for substantial constitutional claims.

The court made several non-binding observations: (1) The district court likely erred in treating statutory preclusion of § 1983 claims as a jurisdictional issue under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than a merits question under Rule 12(b)(6), as the issue concerns the availability of a cause of action rather than the court's power to adjudicate. (2) The Michigan Civil Rights Commission's finding that the response to the Flint water crisis was "the result of systemic racism" was noted but not analyzed for its legal significance. (3) The court suggested that participating in litigation by defending against a preliminary injunction motion and filing jurisdictional briefs does not rise to the level of conduct constituting waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, particularly where no discovery occurred and no final adverse ruling was issued. (4) The court noted that passage of remedial legislation (Public Act 24) and participation in settlement negotiations do not constitute waiver of sovereign immunity. (5) The court observed that relief including medical monitoring, compensatory education, and appointment of monitors can constitute prospective injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young even when it has significant ancillary costs to the state, citing Milliken v. Bradley. (6) The court declined to extend absolute immunity to MDEQ officials, noting that the Supreme Court has been "quite sparing" in recognizing absolute immunity and that officials seeking such immunity bear the burden of showing public policy requires it.

This case is significant for establishing that the Safe Drinking Water Act does not preclude § 1983 claims for constitutional violations arising from water contamination. The decision clarifies the framework for determining statutory preclusion of constitutional claims post-Fitzgerald, emphasizing that courts must examine: (1) statutory text and legislative history for evidence of intent to displace constitutional remedies, (2) whether the remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate such intent, and (3) whether the contours of statutory and constitutional protections diverge. The ruling is important for environmental justice and civil rights litigation, confirming that comprehensive federal regulatory schemes do not automatically foreclose constitutional remedies when the substantive protections diverge significantly. The case reinforces that statutory remedies addressing technical regulatory violations are distinct from constitutional protections against intentional discrimination, deprivation of bodily integrity, and denial of due process. The decision also provides guidance on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and the Ex Parte Young doctrine, particularly regarding what constitutes prospective relief (including medical monitoring and remedial programs with ancillary costs). While decided by a U.S. federal court rather than a South African court, the case has been requested for analysis using South African legal framework conventions.