Cited for the principle that embargo provisions do not afford preference over mortgagees and for describing the charge as a tacit statutory hypothec.
Considered in the context of the bank's argument that a narrower reading of s 118(3) would be more in conformity with the guarantee of property rights in s…
Applied for the settled principle that considerations outside the wording of a statutory provision do not permit an interpretation which is unduly strained.
Cited as authority for the principle against retrospective interpretation of statutes.
Cited to explain that section 118(1) provides a municipality with a different remedy to the one provided by section 118(3).
Applied to explain that the two subsections provide different remedies with different mechanisms, that s 118(3) is an independent, self-contained provision,…
Applied to explain that s 118(1) creates an embargo or veto provision and s 118(3) creates a tacit statutory hypothec.
Court applies the observation by Brand JA that section 118(3) is an independent, self-contained provision to interpret the relationship between s 102 and s…
Cited for the proposition that the veto in s 118(1) and the charge in s 118(3) are separate entities and that s 118(3) is not subject to the time limit in s…
Court cites this case for the principle that an amount paid in order to enable property sold by a trustee to be transferred to the buyer is included in the…