Matamela v Mulaudzi

The appellant was evicted from the respondent's immovable property by order of the Thohoyandou Magistrate's Court. An appeal against the eviction order was noted to the Limpopo Division, Thohoyandou (the high court) on 18 September 2020. On that same day, the high court removed the matter from the roll based on allegations that judges of the division had been 'captured' by certain attorneys, including Anton Ramaano Attorneys (the appellant's attorneys). The court stated it could not hear the appeal while this allegation was under investigation. The appellant then applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which the high court granted on 18 March 2021. The matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal with leave granted by the high court sitting as a court of appeal.

• Whether the Supreme Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear an appeal where leave to appeal was granted by the high court sitting as an appeal court, rather than special leave being granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal itself as required by section 16(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
• Whether the high court sitting as an appeal court has the power to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal
• Whether the Supreme Court of Appeal has inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own proceedings so as to hear an appeal despite the absence of the jurisdictional requirement of special leave

The appeal was struck from the roll with costs. The costs were limited to one counsel only.

The binding legal principle established is that in terms of section 16(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, an appeal against a decision of a high court sitting as an appeal court lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal only upon special leave having been granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal itself. A high court sitting as an appeal court lacks the jurisdictional power to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Such leave, if granted by the high court, is a nullity and does not confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Appeal to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal does not have inherent jurisdiction to assume jurisdiction not conferred upon it by statute, and cannot exercise its inherent power to regulate its own process to extend its jurisdiction beyond statutory limitations.

The Court made observations about the underlying circumstances that led to the removal of the matter from the roll by the high court - namely allegations that judges had been 'captured' by certain attorneys. The Court noted that the high court acknowledged in its judgment granting leave to appeal that refusing a litigant the right to be represented by an attorney of their choice infringes on the litigant's right of access to courts under section 34 of the Constitution. While these observations were referenced in the judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal did not need to decide on the correctness of the high court's approach to the 'capture' allegations, as the jurisdictional issue was determinative. The Court also commented that the matter did not warrant the employment of two counsel, which informed its decision on costs.

This case reinforces the fundamental principle that the Supreme Court of Appeal's jurisdiction is entirely statutory and cannot be extended by the court's inherent powers. It clarifies the mandatory requirements of section 16(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, emphasizing that when a high court sits as an appeal court, only the Supreme Court of Appeal itself can grant special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The case serves as an important reminder to legal practitioners of the correct procedure for seeking leave to appeal from a high court sitting as an appeal court, and confirms that orders granted without proper jurisdiction are nullities. The case also illustrates the strict adherence of South African courts to statutory limitations on jurisdiction, even where there may be compelling substantive reasons to hear a matter.