Van Wyk v The State and Galela v The State

The judgment concerned two separate criminal matters heard together by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), both arising from convictions in regional magistrates’ courts for rape under the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. In Van Wyk, the appellant was convicted of rape and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant and sentenced to an effective 15 years’ imprisonment. His application for leave to appeal was partially successful in the High Court, which allowed an appeal on sentence only, but later dismissed that appeal. Van Wyk then applied to the SCA for special leave to appeal against sentence. In Galela, the appellant was convicted of raping a nine-year-old child and sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment. His application for leave to appeal was refused by the magistrates’ court, and his subsequent petition under s 309C of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was dismissed by the High Court. He then sought special leave from the SCA to appeal further. Both matters raised uncertainty created by the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 regarding the correct appellate route and the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in criminal cases after dismissal by the High Court.

In Van Wyk, special leave to appeal was granted, the appeal against sentence was upheld, and the original sentence was set aside and replaced with a sentence of three years, five months and 28 days’ imprisonment, antedated to 25 March 2011, resulting in Van Wyk’s immediate release. In Galela, the application for special leave to appeal against the High Court’s refusal of his s 309C petition was dismissed.

The case is significant for clarifying the appellate jurisdiction and procedure in criminal matters following the enactment of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. It authoritatively confirms that appeals from High Courts sitting as courts of appeal in criminal cases require special leave from the Supreme Court of Appeal and that High Courts have no jurisdiction to grant such leave. The judgment also reaffirms the principles governing appellate interference in sentencing, particularly the importance of proportionality and the prevention of manifest injustice.