The applicant (C W) and respondent (G T) were in a romantic relationship from 2016 and married on 15 September 2018 out of community of property with the accrual system. The applicant alleged that the respondent fraudulently misrepresented that he loved her and intended to remain married to her, thereby inducing her to agree to the marriage. Shortly after the wedding, the respondent’s conduct allegedly changed drastically, culminating in her being ordered to leave the marital home and divorce proceedings being instituted. The applicant claimed that she later discovered that, at the time of the proposal and marriage, the respondent already regarded the relationship as over. She instituted an action claiming patrimonial damages of R331 342.36 for wasted wedding expenses based on fraudulent misrepresentation, relying on the lex Aquilia (and separately the actio iniuriarum). The respondent raised exceptions, contending that South African law does not recognise a delictual claim for pure economic loss arising from a marriage induced by misrepresentation. The High Court upheld the exception to the lex Aquilia claim. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The application for leave to appeal was granted; the appeal was upheld with costs; the High Court order was altered to dismiss the defendant’s exceptions to both the lex Aquilia and actio iniuriarum claims with costs; the High Court’s costs order relating to the refusal of leave to appeal was set aside; and the costs of the leave to appeal applications were ordered to be costs in the action.
The case is significant for clarifying that claims for patrimonial loss based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentation inducing marriage cannot be dismissed at exception stage merely because they raise novel policy considerations. It reaffirms the strict test for exceptions and underscores that questions about extending delictual liability, particularly in cases of pure economic loss, are generally matters for trial. The judgment also cautions courts against intruding into the merits and substituting subjective policy views when assessing pleadings.