The first applicant is a Zimbabwean citizen who married the second applicant, a Nigerian citizen. On 19 July 2012, the second applicant was declared a prohibited person under s 14(1)(i) of the Immigration Act [Chapter 4:02] after illegally entering and staying in Zimbabwe. Despite this prohibition order, the applicants entered into a civil marriage in South Africa on 15 August 2015, and a church wedding in Nigeria on 5 August 2017. They have two children together - one born in South Africa (30 December 2015) and one born in Zimbabwe (10 September 2018). Six years after the prohibition order, on 8 May 2018 and 20 June 2018, the applicants wrote to the Minister of Home Affairs seeking revocation of the second applicant's prohibited person status. When no decision was forthcoming, they filed this application on 28 August 2018 seeking a mandatory interdict to compel the first respondent to revoke the second applicant's prohibited person status and allow him to enter Zimbabwe.
The application for an order mandating the first respondent to revoke the second applicant's prohibited person status was dismissed with costs.
Marriage to a citizen of Zimbabwe does not exorcise prohibited person status under the Immigration Act. The Minister's power to revoke prohibited person declarations under s 14(7) of the Immigration Act is limited to declarations made under s 14(1)(a) and (g) only, and does not extend to declarations made under other subsections including s 14(1)(i). Where individuals voluntarily enter into a marriage relationship knowing one party has prohibited person status under the Immigration Act, they cannot successfully claim that the resulting interference with their constitutional rights to family life and freedom of movement is unlawful, as such interference is lawfully prescribed by the Immigration Act and represents a justifiable limitation under s 86(2) of the Constitution. Proper procedure for challenging prohibited person status requires appeal or review to the Magistrates Court under s 21(1) or application for exemption under s 16, not seeking mandatory interdicts compelling the Minister to revoke status he has no power to revoke.
The court observed that both parties were mistaken about the applicable provisions of the Immigration Act, except that s 14(1)(i) was correctly identified as the basis of the prohibition order. The court noted that s 16(1) grants the Minister wholesale power to exempt any person from prohibition under the entirety of s 14(1), which would have been the appropriate avenue for the applicants. The court commented that the application appeared to be an attempt to obtain revocation "by the back door" since instead of seeking a declaration of rights, the first applicant sought relief that the second applicant's status be revoked. Charewa J noted the curious fact that the second applicant, as the prohibited person, chose only to support the first applicant with affidavits rather than being the main applicant, and that these affidavits were notably lacking in evidence showing he was suitable for revocation. The court expressed concern about the lack of candor by the applicants regarding when they met and whether they had a customary marriage prior to 2012, noting they could have provided documentary proof or affidavits from relatives if such a marriage existed. The judge also noted that the foreign marriage documents were unnotarized and the originals were never produced, raising concerns about their veracity.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean immigration law as it: (1) Clarifies the limited scope of the Minister's power under s 14(7) of the Immigration Act to revoke prohibited person status - only applicable to orders under s 14(1)(a) and (g), not other subsections. (2) Reaffirms that marriage to a Zimbabwean citizen does not automatically remove prohibited person status or entitle a prohibited immigrant to enter and reside in Zimbabwe. (3) Establishes that individuals who voluntarily enter into marriages knowing one party has prohibited person status cannot claim constitutional rights violations when the consequences of that status materialize. (4) Emphasizes proper procedure must be followed in immigration matters - appeals/reviews to Magistrates Court under s 21(1) or exemption applications under s 16, rather than seeking mandatory interdicts. (5) Demonstrates the court's supervisory (not substitutionary) role in administrative matters and the balance between individual rights and state sovereignty in regulating immigration. (6) Shows that constitutional rights under ss 66, 78, and 81 are subject to lawful limitation under s 86(2) where the limitation is prescribed by law, pursues legitimate aims, and is proportionate.