The court observed that both parties were mistaken about the applicable provisions of the Immigration Act, except that s 14(1)(i) was correctly identified as the basis of the prohibition order. The court noted that s 16(1) grants the Minister wholesale power to exempt any person from prohibition under the entirety of s 14(1), which would have been the appropriate avenue for the applicants. The court commented that the application appeared to be an attempt to obtain revocation "by the back door" since instead of seeking a declaration of rights, the first applicant sought relief that the second applicant's status be revoked. Charewa J noted the curious fact that the second applicant, as the prohibited person, chose only to support the first applicant with affidavits rather than being the main applicant, and that these affidavits were notably lacking in evidence showing he was suitable for revocation. The court expressed concern about the lack of candor by the applicants regarding when they met and whether they had a customary marriage prior to 2012, noting they could have provided documentary proof or affidavits from relatives if such a marriage existed. The judge also noted that the foreign marriage documents were unnotarized and the originals were never produced, raising concerns about their veracity.