Annatjie Robinson v Trustees of Kareedouw Body Corporate

The applicant, Annatjie Robinson, is the registered owner of unit 44 in Kareedouw Body Corporate, a sectional title scheme. She complained that the respondent trustees installed speedbumps in the complex on 21 November 2022 without following the proper process required under the sectional titles management rules. She alleged that owners were not consulted, that no due process was followed, and that the speedbumps did not comply with SABS regulations. She sought orders directing removal of the speedbumps and compelling the body corporate to provide documents, namely minutes of the meeting approving the installation, regulations supporting the materials used, and invoices and details of persons paid. The respondent contended that speeding in the complex had long posed a serious safety risk, particularly because of narrow internal roads, blind spots, a centrally located pool area, and an increase in children living in the scheme. It said other measures such as mirrors, speed signs, reminders, newsletters and warnings had failed, and that the trustees resolved to install six speedbumps as an urgent and reasonably necessary safety measure, relying on PMR 24(5)(b)(ii). The respondent also produced invoices and minutes showing trustee approval and prior warnings to residents about possible installation of speedbumps.

• Whether the installation of speedbumps constituted an alteration or improvement to common property requiring compliance with PMR 29(1) or 29(2) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management framework.
• Whether the trustees were entitled to authorise and fund the installation of speedbumps as an urgent, reasonably necessary safety measure under PMR 24(5)(b)(ii).
• Whether the expenditure on speedbumps fell within the directions and spending restrictions imposed by members at the AGM.
• Whether an order directing removal of the speedbumps on the basis of alleged non-compliance with SABS regulations falls within the remedies available under s 39 of the CSOS Act.
• Whether the applicant established a proper basis for relief under s 39(7)(a) compelling access to the requested documents and information.

The application was dismissed. The adjudicator ordered that all relief sought by the applicant be refused, and made no order as to costs.

Where trustees of a body corporate have reasonable grounds to believe that immediate expenditure is necessary to ensure safety or prevent significant loss or damage, they may authorise such expenditure under PMR 24(5)(b)(ii) without first following the member approval procedures in PMR 29 applicable to non-urgent alterations or improvements to common property, provided the expenditure remains within the directions and restrictions imposed by members. In addition, a CSOS adjudicator may grant only relief that falls within the remedies listed in s 39 of the CSOS Act, and relief outside that scope must be refused.

The adjudicator remarked that if the respondent sought relief of its own, it had to do so by way of a formal application complying with s 38 of the CSOS Act, with reference to Rapallo Body Corporate v Dhlamini NO and Others (12572/2019) [2020] ZAWCHC 97 (10 September 2020). The adjudicator also referred to Trustees for the Time Being of the Avenues Body Corporate v Alain Shmaryahu and CSOS, case no A31/2018, as authority that adjudicators may not grant remedies not matching s 39. To the extent the adjudicator suggested PMR 29 applies only where an installation is not urgent, that broader formulation was ancillary to the concrete finding that the speedbumps were urgent and reasonably necessary on the facts.

The decision is significant in the community schemes context because it distinguishes between non-urgent improvements to common property, which ordinarily trigger member approval procedures under PMR 29, and urgent safety-related measures that trustees may authorise under PMR 24(5)(b)(ii). It also confirms that CSOS adjudicators are confined to granting relief that falls within s 39 of the CSOS Act, and cannot make orders outside that statutory remedial framework. The ruling further illustrates that document-access relief under s 39(7)(a) requires a proper factual basis and will not be granted where the requested documents are already available.