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Applied for the principle that when assessing compliance with statutory provisions, the question is whether what was done constituted compliance viewed in…
Cited for the principle that economic transformation and redress for previously disadvantaged people is a constitutional imperative in mining and procurement.
Applied for the principle that once a ground of review under PAJA is established under section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, the decision must be declared…
This is the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment from which AllPay now seeks leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court; the appeal to the Constitutional Court…
This Court held that there is a clear distinction between constitutional invalidity of administrative action and the just and equitable remedy that may follow…
Considered as an example of a high court declaring a tender process illegal and invalid but not setting aside the award, though the Constitutional Court later…
Cited for the principle that this Court will hear a matter raising a constitutional issue if the interests of justice so require.
Cited for the judicial task in assessing whether evidence justifies the conclusion that any grounds of review under PAJA exist.
Cited in relation to the importance of compliance with mandatory and material procedural requirements.
Cited in relation to the blurring between procedure and merit in pre-constitutional common-law judicial review where the irregularity flowed from an error of…
Cited for the meaning of 'adversely affect the rights' in PAJA section 1, namely that administrative action has the capacity to affect legal rights.
Cited to support the proposition that irregularities in a process which may affect the fairness of the outcome have the capacity to affect legal rights.
Cited for the principle that a cause of action for judicial review arises from PAJA and not section 33 of the Constitution.
Cited to show that even under the common law the blurring of procedure and merit did not necessarily apply where procedural fairness was compromised; also…
Cited for the principle that a cause of action for judicial review ordinarily arises from PAJA and not directly from section 33 of the Constitution.
Cited in relation to the ability of administrators to depart from procedures under section 3(4) of PAJA.
Cited for the principle that it may be inequitable to require re-running a flawed tender process if the same result is confidently predictable, and for the…
Applied for the principle distinguishing between invalidity of administrative action and the just and equitable remedy that follows; also cited for the…
Cited for the principle that a tender process relying on uncertain criteria is opposed to fairness and the public interest.
Distinguished because there the Labour Relations Act gave exclusive jurisdiction and content to employment disputes, unlike the procurement framework here…
Applied for the test for admissibility of new evidence on appeal: it must be so crucial that it would likely change the outcome.
Cited for the proposition that pre-constitutional common law sometimes blurred procedure and merit in judicial review.
Cited to support the proposition that procurement disputes about interpretation of section 217 of the Constitution raise constitutional matters.
Cited for the principle that tender processes require comparable offers, tenders must speak for themselves, and competitors must be treated equally to serve…
Applied for the principle that substantive empowerment requires that historically disadvantaged individuals actually exercise control and managerial power…
Cited for the rejection of strict formal distinctions between mandatory and directory provisions in administrative law.
Cited for the principle that once a PAJA ground of review is established, section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution requires the decision to be declared unlawful.