This judgment is significant for several reasons: (1) It clarifies that section 29(2) of the Constitution applies in its totality to the education sector, including universities; (2) It establishes that universities bear a negative duty not to remove existing language rights without appropriate justification showing it is not reasonably practicable to maintain them; (3) It defines the test for "reasonable practicability" as having both factual elements (resource constraints, feasibility) and legal/normative elements (equity, redress, desegregation, non-racialism); (4) It emphasizes that the mere exercise of one's right to be taught in their mother tongue cannot be rendered unconstitutional where it has not been shown that non-Afrikaans students would be deprived of learning opportunities, that maintaining it was unaffordable, or that it would result in unlawful racial discrimination; (5) It distinguishes distance education from residential universities in terms of language policy implications - distance education does not create the same risks of racial segregation in classrooms; (6) It sets high evidentiary standards for universities seeking to remove existing language rights, requiring proper data, costing studies, consideration of alternatives like cross-subsidization, and explicit engagement with constitutional requirements; (7) It recognizes that even a "minority" of students (25,000-30,000 out of much larger student body) may constitute a significant number deserving constitutional protection; (8) It affirms that the development of indigenous African languages cannot be used as justification for removing an already developed and functional language of learning without sound reasons. The judgment represents an important application of language rights in the higher education context and reinforces constitutional protection for minority language speakers.