Adelakun v First Rand Bank Ltd and Others

The applicant, a self-represented United States citizen, sought urgent relief against FirstRand Bank (FNB) and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). His bank account had been blocked in August 2018 under Exchange Control Regulations, and funds were subsequently moved and partially refunded. After allegations of fraud, his account was again placed on hold. The applicant was provisionally sequestrated in March 2019 and finally sequestrated in January 2020. In August 2021, the SARB published a Notice and Order of Forfeiture, forfeiting the remaining blocked funds to the state. FNB complied by transferring over R3.8 million to the SARB in March 2022. Nearly six years after the initial events, the applicant launched an urgent application in the Western Cape High Court, citing his recent fatherhood on 14 June 2024 as the basis for urgency. All respondents were stationed in Gauteng, where the material events occurred.

• Whether the Western Cape High Court has jurisdiction over a matter where the cause of action arose in Gauteng and all respondents are domiciled in Gauteng.
• Whether the application met the requirements for urgency under Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
• Whether the court should show leniency to a self-represented litigant who presents a procedurally and substantively deficient case.

The application was struck from the roll with costs on an attorney and client scale, including counsel's costs, for lack of jurisdiction and lack of urgency.

A court must establish its jurisdiction as a preliminary threshold issue before considering urgency or merits. Where the cause of action arose and the respondents are domiciled outside the court's territorial jurisdiction, the court lacks the power to hear the matter. Furthermore, urgency under Rule 6(12) requires real and immediate circumstances, not contrived or self-created urgency; a delay of nearly six years is fatal to any claim of urgency.

The court made extensive non-binding observations on the duty of courts to assist unrepresented litigants. It noted that while section 34 of the Constitution guarantees access to courts and courts must show reasonable leniency to self-represented persons, such accommodation has clear limits. The court cannot act as the litigant's legal representative and must not compromise the integrity of judicial processes or prejudice the rights of opposing parties through excessive leniency. The court also noted it was providing reasons beyond jurisdiction (striking for lack of urgency) to prevent further abuse of process on the same facts in a different division.

The case reinforces the fundamental principle that jurisdiction is a threshold issue that must be resolved before any other procedural or substantive inquiry. It confirms that an applicant's residence alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction when the cause of action and respondents are located elsewhere. The case also provides guidance on the scope of judicial assistance owed to self-represented litigants, emphasising that leniency must not compromise procedural fairness, and clarifies the strict approach courts take to self-created or long-delayed urgency claims.