The appellants imported garments from Malawi under a trade agreement between South Africa and Malawi concluded on 19 June 1990 and promulgated under the Customs and Excise Duty Act 91 of 1964. Article 2 of the agreement provided that goods produced or manufactured in Malawi must be imported into South Africa free of customs duty. Article 6(ii) required that at least 25% of the production cost of goods must be represented by materials produced and labour performed in Malawi for goods to qualify as produced or manufactured there. The respondents (SARS) argued that 'production cost' must be interpreted in accordance with section 46 and rule 46 of the Customs and Excise Duty Act, which provided a restrictive definition. The appellants contended that 'production cost' should be given its ordinary grammatical meaning, encompassing all costs involved in production. On the respondents' interpretation, the imported goods did not meet the 25% requirement; on the appellants' interpretation, they did. The court a quo (Roux J) found in favour of the respondents. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
The appeal was dismissed with costs, including costs for two counsel. The court upheld the finding that section 46 and rule 46 of the Customs and Excise Duty Act apply to the determination of 'production cost' under Article 6(ii) of the South Africa-Malawi trade agreement, and that the imported garments did not qualify for duty-free treatment.
When an international trade agreement is incorporated into the Customs and Excise Duty Act under sections 49 and 51, it becomes part of that Act and must be interpreted in accordance with the Act's provisions. Terms used in such agreements that are defined or given specific meaning in the Act (or rules made under it) must be interpreted according to those statutory meanings unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. Section 46 and rule 46, which set out the method for calculating 'production cost' for determining whether goods are produced or manufactured in a particular territory, apply to trade agreements unless the agreement expressly and validly provides otherwise. The empowering provision in section 51 stating 'notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act' does not authorize agreements that conflict with section 46 because section 46 defines the fundamental concept of what constitutes goods 'produced or manufactured' in a territory, which is the subject matter of section 51. To interpret an agreement in a manner that conflicts with mandatory statutory provisions would render the agreement ultra vires. Administrative practice or officials' interpretations of trade agreements cannot override clear statutory requirements or create legitimate expectations that bind the state in revenue matters.
The court noted that even if the 1999 amendment to section 46(1), which added the words 'except where any agreement contemplated in section 49 or 51 otherwise provides', could have altered the interpretation of Article 6(ii), it would only have done so if the agreement clearly 'otherwise provided', which it did not. The court observed that while entrepreneurs might hope for stability in customs arrangements, the agreement provided no guarantees against changes, expressly contemplating changes in Malawian legislation and allowing for unilateral suspension or modification by either party with notice. The court commented that the difference in language between Article 6(i) (using Malawian statutory terms of art like 'specified country content') and Article 6(ii) (using 'production cost') indicated that Article 6(i) was governed by Malawian legislation while Article 6(ii) was governed by South African legislation. The court noted that it is trite law that unless language compels it, provisions should not be read so as to render them invalid.
This case is significant for establishing important principles regarding the interpretation of international trade agreements incorporated into South African domestic law. It clarifies that such agreements, once promulgated under the Customs and Excise Duty Act, form part of that Act and must be interpreted consistently with the Act's provisions, including definitions and regulatory framework. The judgment affirms that statutory provisions governing customs matters cannot be circumvented by trade agreements unless expressly permitted by enabling legislation. It also reinforces the principle from Cape Central Railways that administrative practice or officials' interpretations cannot override statutory obligations, particularly regarding revenue collection. The case provides guidance on reconciling general statutory provisions with specific trade agreement terms, holding that they should be read harmoniously rather than in conflict. It demonstrates the courts' approach to statutory interpretation in the customs and excise context, emphasizing textual consistency and the legislative hierarchy.