The Court made several obiter observations. It noted that while it might seem harsh to deprive an impecunious defendant of a right of appeal at the provisional sentence stage when required to pay before entering the principal case, one must not lose sight of the fact that a plaintiff armed with a prima facie liquid document is entitled to the long-established expeditious remedy of provisional sentence. The Court explained that when provisional sentence is granted, the defendant can, subject to paying the debt and obtaining security de restituendo from the plaintiff, go into the principal case and obtain reversal of the provisional sentence order. Similarly, where provisional sentence is refused (unless due to a bad or defective summons), the summons will stand as the summons in the action and proceedings can continue as if provisional sentence had never been claimed. The Court also noted the historical context that the statutory right of appeal which defendants enjoyed until 1982 under section 20(a) and (b) of Act 59 of 1959 was removed by the Appeals Amendment Act 105 of 1982. Regarding costs, the Court observed that despite the court of first instance possibly being influenced by the incorrect argument regarding partial appealability of liquidity issues, it would not be appropriate to deprive the respondent of costs because the respondent was obliged to defend the provisional sentence obtained, at least in regard to the other arguments advanced by the appellant on the merits.