City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Vresthena (Pty) Ltd & Others

Vresthena (Pty) Ltd owned six units in Zambesi Retail Park shopping centre and leased properties to different businesses sharing a single electricity supply point. The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality provided electricity through a dysfunctional Body Corporate. On 28 March 2022, the Municipality issued disconnection notices due to non-payment, and disconnected electricity and water on 13 April 2022. Vresthena filed an urgent application seeking reconnection and acceptance of its application for a separate electricity connection. On 16 June 2022, the High Court granted an interim order directing the Municipality to restore services within 14 days. The Municipality applied for leave to appeal, which was granted on 28 September 2022 with the order to be executed pending appeal. The Municipality appealed to the Full Court under section 18(4) of the Superior Courts Act, which dismissed the appeal on 10 November 2022. The Municipality then filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal on 22 November 2022, arguing for multiple appeals under section 18(4).

• Whether section 18(4)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 allows for a second automatic right to appeal to the 'next highest court' after a full court has already heard an appeal under section 18(4)
• The proper interpretation of the phrase 'next highest court' in section 18(4) of the Superior Courts Act
• Whether the notice of appeal filed by the Municipality was irregular and void
• Whether limiting appeals under section 18(4) to one automatic appeal infringes the constitutional right of access to courts under section 34 of the Constitution

The matter was struck from the roll with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed.

Section 18(4)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 provides for only one automatic right of appeal to the 'next highest court' against an order made under section 18(3). The plain language of the provision, using the singular 'an' and 'court', restricts further appeals beyond the first automatic appeal. Where a single judge grants an order under section 18(3), the next highest court is the full court of the same division. Once the full court has heard and decided the automatic appeal under section 18(4), no further appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Appeal under this provision. The decision of the 'next highest court' in a section 18(4) appeal is final. Section 18(4) creates a sui generis category of appeals designed for exceptional circumstances, providing streamlined and expedited access to one appeal, but not multiple appeals. The constitutional right of access to courts under section 34 of the Constitution does not guarantee unlimited rights of appeal, and limiting appeals under section 18(4) to one automatic appeal does not violate this constitutional right.

The Court noted that the current matter exemplified the mischief the legislature intended to address through section 18(4), as despite multiple court orders since June 2022, the Municipality had still not reconnected electricity to Vresthena, thus frustrating the purpose of the extraordinary appeal process. The Court emphasized that section 18(4) serves as a protective measure to prevent irreversible harm, requiring immediate documentation of reasons, automatic right of appeal, urgent hearing, and automatic suspension pending appeal. The Court observed that if a party wishes to avoid suspension of an execution order and potential harm, their recourse is to approach the head of the court overseeing the appeal to expedite an urgent hearing. The Court referenced the Constitutional Court's guidance in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality regarding severance or addition of words to provisions, emphasizing alignment with the Constitution while minimizing interference with legislative intent.

This judgment provides authoritative interpretation of section 18(4) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, clarifying that the automatic right of appeal to the 'next highest court' is limited to one appeal only. The case establishes important principles regarding the balance between access to courts and preventing abuse of appeal processes. It confirms that the constitutional right of access to courts under section 34 does not guarantee unlimited rights of appeal and that procedural limitations on appeals do not necessarily violate constitutional rights. The judgment demonstrates the court's approach to statutory interpretation, applying both textual and purposive methods. It also highlights the consequences of attempting to pursue appeals beyond what the statute permits, with such appeals being struck from the roll as irregular and void. The case is significant for understanding the sui generis nature of section 18(4) appeals and the expedited process intended by the legislature for exceptional circumstances involving irreparable harm.