The Health Professions Council of South Africa and the Professional Board for Emergency Care Practitioners (the appellants) are statutory bodies created under the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974, responsible for controlling and accrediting training of emergency care practitioners (paramedics). Emergency Medical Supplies and Training CC (EMS) operated a private training college accredited to train different levels of emergency care practitioners. In 2004, the Board was reconstituted by members allegedly competitors of EMS. On 10 December 2006, the Board withdrew EMS's accreditation for all its training courses without furnishing reasons, effectively closing the college. EMS appealed to the Western Cape High Court on 12 January 2007 under s 20 of the Act, citing various grounds including lack of jurisdiction, conflicts of interest, and bias. The Council refused to prepare the appeal record. EMS prepared its own record and filed a founding affidavit on 12 January 2008. The appellants then applied to have the appeal declared out of time or lapsed, to strike out EMS's record and replace it with their own, and to strike out paragraphs of the founding affidavit. The high court had to determine the nature of the appeal under s 20 of the Act to resolve these procedural issues.
The appeal was struck from the roll. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the hearing incurred from 30 April 2010, including costs of two counsel. The costs order date reflected that EMS had offered on 28 April 2010 to have the appeal withdrawn with costs in the cause, which offer remained open until 30 April 2010, but the appellants only declined on 3 May 2010.
Even where an order is final in effect, definitive of the rights of parties, and disposes of a substantial portion of relief claimed (the Zweni requirements), it may not be appealable if the balance of convenience does not favour piecemeal consideration of the case. The test is whether the appeal, if leave were given, would lead to a just and reasonably prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties. Courts should not entertain appeals against discrete orders made during proceedings where all issues in dispute have not been determined and the balance of convenience requires that all matters be resolved together in one hearing, unless a litigant would suffer prejudice or injustice if the order is left to stand. The approach to appealability should be flexible and pragmatic, directed to doing what is appropriate in the particular circumstances rather than applying rigid technical distinctions.
Lewis JA observed that courts, when requested to grant leave to appeal against orders or judgments made during the course of proceedings, should be careful not to grant leave where the issue is one that will be dealt with in isolation and where the balance of the issues in the matter have yet to be determined. The court noted that once leave to appeal has been granted, the issue of convenience cannot be visited or revisited because it is not a requirement for leave but only a practical consideration that a court should take into account when deciding whether to grant leave. The court also commented that the determination of appealability has become increasingly flexible and pragmatic in recent times, directed more to doing what is appropriate in the particular circumstances than to elevating the distinction between appealable and non-appealable orders to one of principle.
This case provides important guidance on appealability in South African civil procedure, particularly regarding interlocutory orders. It emphasizes that even where an order meets the technical requirements of appealability (final in effect, definitive of rights, disposing of substantial relief), courts must consider the balance of convenience and whether piecemeal appeals would lead to a just and prompt resolution of disputes. The judgment reinforces the principle against fragmenting litigation through multiple appeals, promoting efficiency and justice by requiring all related issues to be determined together unless there are compelling reasons (such as prejudice or injustice) requiring immediate appellate intervention. It demonstrates a flexible and pragmatic approach to appealability rather than a rigid, formalistic one. The case also illustrates the application of these principles in the context of statutory appeals under sector-specific legislation.
Explore 2 related cases • Click to navigate