Julius Malema, President of the EFF and MP, applied for a declaratory order that statements published by Thembinkosi Rawula (a former EFF member who served on its Central Command Team) on Facebook were defamatory and unlawful. On 5 April 2019, shortly before resigning from the EFF, Rawula published a detailed Facebook post alleging that Malema and Floyd Shivambu controlled EFF funds under "control, abuse and dictatorship"; that they used training providers who inflated costs by 250% so they could "run away with 150%"; and that Malema admitted at a CCT meeting that the EFF took VBS money to finance the revolution. VBS Mutual Bank had collapsed in 2018 with over R2 billion in debt after widespread looting that victimized disadvantaged depositors, particularly the aged of Limpopo. The Facebook post received extensive media coverage. Malema's attorneys demanded retraction; Rawula refused. Malema sought declaratory relief that the statements were defamatory and unlawful, removal of the post, an apology, an interdict against further publication, and R1 million in damages. By the appeal stage, Malema abandoned claims for damages, retraction, apology and interdict, pursuing only the declaratory orders.
Appeal dismissed. No costs order made in the High Court or Supreme Court of Appeal.
In defamation proceedings brought by motion for declaratory relief and/or interdict: (1) Motion proceedings are an appropriate procedure for seeking interdicts and declaratory orders in defamation cases, but not for claims for unliquidated damages which require oral evidence. (2) Where defamatory statements are published, there is a presumption of unlawfulness which the respondent must rebut by establishing a defence. (3) To resist an interdict or declaratory order on grounds of truth and public interest, a respondent must lay a "sustainable foundation by way of evidence" that such defence is available - it is insufficient to merely assert that the statements are true without providing a factual basis. (4) The Plascon-Evans rule applies: where there is a material dispute of fact as to whether published statements were true and in the public interest, the dispute must be resolved in the respondent's favour, meaning the applicant is not entitled to declaratory relief or interdict. (5) A respondent's "insider" position and access to privileged information, combined with specific factual allegations that cannot be rejected as implausible, may constitute sufficient foundation for a defence of truth and public interest, creating a triable issue unsuitable for final determination on motion. (6) An interdict is directed at future conduct; if there is no risk of republication, an interdict will not be granted.
The majority judgment made several significant observations: (1) Courts should show understanding when dealing with self-represented litigants who are "operating in an alien environment in what is for them effectively a foreign language" and "experiencing feelings of fear, ignorance, frustration, anger, bewilderment and disadvantage" (citing UK Supreme Court guidance), though this does not entitle them to better treatment than represented parties. (2) The context in which defamatory statements are made (here, in the run-up to a general election) is relevant, as suppression of speech in an electoral context has severe negative consequences. (3) The publication of a defamatory statement by the press, without the subject seeking legal redress against those publications, may be relevant context when assessing whether to grant relief against a different publisher of similar allegations. (4) Where a respondent alleges lack of financial accountability and the applicant has exclusive control of relevant financial records, the respondent's inability to provide detailed evidence may be explained by that asymmetry of information. The minority judgment observed that evidence of what a respondent knew at the time of publication and what steps were taken to verify information is relevant to defences of reasonable publication or absence of animus iniuriandi, but not directly relevant to the objective question of whether statements were actually true.
This case clarifies important procedural and substantive principles in South African defamation law: (1) Confirms that motion proceedings are appropriate for obtaining interdicts and declaratory relief in defamation cases, following the established principle in Heilbron v Blignaut, but unliquidated damages must be claimed through action proceedings. (2) Articulates the evidentiary threshold for defamation defences in motion proceedings: a respondent must lay a "sustainable foundation" by way of admissible evidence that a defence is available, not merely assert it by ipse dixit. (3) Applies constitutional freedom of expression considerations in the defamation context, particularly regarding public figures and matters of public interest. (4) Demonstrates the application of the Plascon-Evans rule in defamation cases where factual disputes exist about defences. (5) Addresses the challenges faced by self-represented litigants in complex defamation proceedings. (6) Illustrates how "insider" status and access to privileged information affects the assessment of whether a respondent has established a factual foundation for truth. The case is particularly significant in the political context, involving allegations about the management of a major political party's finances and its connection to the VBS banking scandal.
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