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South African Law • Jurisdictional Corpus
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Bongani Dlamini v The State; Vusi Dladla and Others v The State; The State v Mark David Joubert; The State v Jan Johannes Schietekat

Citation1999 (4) SA 623 (CC); 1999 (7) BCLR 771 (CC); CCT 21/98; CCT 22/98; CCT 2/99; CCT 4/99
JurisdictionZA
Area of Law
Constitutional LawCriminal ProcedureBailCriminal LawEvidence

Facts of the Case

Four consolidated cases challenging various provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 relating to bail. Dlamini: The appellant applied for bail stating he was present when crimes were committed but acted under compulsion. At trial, he pleaded not guilty with an alibi defence. The prosecution used the bail record to impeach his credibility. Schietekat: A middle-aged paedophile with prior convictions was charged with indecent assault on a 3-year-old. Bail was refused on the basis that his release would pose a serious risk to the community. The High Court struck down sections 60(4)-(9) and 60(11B)(c) as unconstitutional. Joubert: Charged with murdering his wife. Magistrate refused bail. On appeal, the High Court granted bail but also struck down sections 60(4)-(9) and 60(11B)(c). Dladla and 4 others: Charged with 9 counts of murder and 5 attempted murders allegedly committed during taxi violence. They challenged sections 60(11)(a), 60(11B)(c) and 60(14) which restricted access to police dockets for bail applications.

Legal Issues

  • Whether sections 60(4)-(9) of the CPA violate the separation of powers doctrine by prescribing to courts what is in the 'interests of justice'
  • Whether section 60(4)(a) and (5) permit unconstitutional preventive detention based on factors unrelated to trial
  • Whether section 60(4)(e) and (8A) unconstitutionally frustrate the right to bail by focusing on community sentiment rather than the accused
  • Whether section 60(11)(a) effectively denies bail to persons charged with Schedule 6 offences through the 'exceptional circumstances' requirement
  • Whether section 60(11B)(c) unconstitutionally infringes the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination by making bail testimony admissible at trial
  • Whether section 60(14) unconstitutionally restricts access to police dockets for bail purposes
  • Whether the record of bail proceedings is admissible at trial and under what circumstances
  • The proper interpretation of 'interests of justice' in section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution and section 60 of the CPA

Judicial Outcome

Dlamini: Appeal dismissed. Dladla: Direct access granted. Declared that sections 60(11)(a), 60(11B)(c) and 60(14) are not unconstitutional. Schietekat: Appeal upheld. Order declaring sections 60(4)-(9) and 60(11B)(c) unconstitutional not confirmed. Joubert: Appeal upheld. Order declaring sections 60(4)-(9) and 60(11B)(c) unconstitutional not confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

1. Sections 60(4)-(9) of the CPA provide permissive guidelines, not mandatory prescriptions, and do not violate separation of powers. Courts must exercise independent judgment weighing the factors listed. 2. The 'interests of justice' in section 35(1)(f) and section 60(1)(a) encompasses a broad value judgment taking into account the arrestee's right to liberty as qualified by lawful arrest, and includes but is not limited to trial-related factors. 3. In sections 60(4), (9) and (10), 'interests of justice' bears a narrower meaning approximating societal interests or interests of the state, which must be weighed against the accused's personal liberty interests. 4. The right to bail under section 35(1)(f) is not absolute. It permits release only if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions. The Constitution itself sanctions that persons may be arrested and detained for allegedly having committed offences. 5. Factors unrelated to trial (risk to public safety, likelihood of committing further offences) can legitimately be considered in bail determinations under section 60(4)(a), provided there is a probability (not mere possibility) that such risk will materialize. 6. Sections 60(4)(e) and (8A), which permit denial of bail based on community sentiment and public peace concerns, limit section 35(1)(f) but are saved under section 36 as reasonable and justifiable given: (a) exceptional circumstances requirement; (b) temporary nature of awaiting-trial detention; (c) close relationship between detention and prevention of disorder; (d) judicial control and flexibility; and (e) South Africa's prevailing crime context. 7. Section 60(11)(a)'s 'exceptional circumstances' requirement for Schedule 6 offences limits the right to bail but is justified under section 36 because: (a) it applies only to the most serious violent crimes; (b) it allows consideration of individual circumstances; (c) it maintains judicial control; and (d) it is a proportionate response to serious violent crime. 8. The requirement that an accused be given a 'reasonable opportunity' to establish exceptional circumstances in section 60(11)(a) means courts must ensure the accused has sufficient information about the charges to make out a case for bail, which may require the prosecutor to provide such information notwithstanding section 60(14). 9. Section 60(14) restricts physical access to police dockets at bail stage but does not prevent provision of necessary information to give effect to the 'reasonable opportunity' requirement in section 60(11). 10. Section 60(11B)(c) does not violate the right to silence or privilege against self-incrimination. An accused who, properly warned and acting on informed choice, elects to testify at bail proceedings exercises constitutional autonomy. Whether such testimony is admissible at trial depends on whether its admission would render the trial unfair - a determination for the trial court based on all circumstances. 11. The right to silence protects against compulsion, not against the consequences of voluntary, informed choices to speak. There is no constitutional right to advance one version at bail proceedings and another at trial with impunity. 12. Trial courts have a duty to exclude evidence from bail proceedings where its admission would render the trial unfair, including where evidence was obtained through prosecutorial abuse of cross-examination rights. 13. Bail proceedings are unique interlocutory proceedings where: (a) the issue is not guilt but where the interests of justice lie regarding bail; (b) formal rules of evidence are relaxed; (c) courts must act pro-actively and inquisitorially; and (d) courts must ensure procedural fairness including proper warnings about the consequences of testifying.

Obiter Dicta

1. The Court noted, without deciding, the unresolved question of whether courts have jurisdiction to make orders of constitutional invalidity in the absence of a live constitutional issue warranting such conduct, as appeared to have occurred in Schietekat and Joubert after the bail appeals were decided on the facts. 2. The Court emphasized the importance of judicial officers remaining alert to preventing orchestrated public sentiment by pressure groups from unduly influencing bail decisions. 3. The Court stressed the critical importance of judicial officers ensuring that unrepresented accused persons are properly informed of their rights, particularly given South Africa's historical context and the need for informed choices. 4. The Court observed that bail serves not only the liberty interest of the accused but also the public interest by reducing the number of awaiting-trial prisoners and families deprived of breadwinners. 5. The Court noted that much work needs to be done to educate the public about the purpose and effect of bail, the presumption of innocence, and the qualified right to freedom pending trial. 6. The Court commented on the disturbing tendency of media, special interest groups and public figures to exceed legitimate criticism by imputing improper motives to judicial officers who make unpopular bail decisions. 7. The Court acknowledged the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies and prosecutors in adapting to the constitutional era, showing understanding for the uncertainty that had arisen. 8. The Court observed that litigation in general and criminal defence in particular presents many difficult choices in an adversarial system, and that the Constitution protects the right to make choices but does not eliminate the need to make them. 9. The Court noted that the precise meaning and scope of various aspects of the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination need not be fully resolved in this case, as those terms embrace ill-defined and disparate concepts in different common law jurisdictions. 10. The Court emphasized that the purpose of bail proceedings is to protect the investigation and prosecution of the case against hindrance, not to determine guilt. 11. The Court observed that even convicted persons sentenced to imprisonment can be and often are released on bail pending appeal, reinforcing that entitlement to bail is not dependent on innocence. 12. The Court provided comparative analysis of bail provisions in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia, noting that limitations on bail exist in all these democratic jurisdictions, though the specific approaches vary.

Legal Significance

This is a foundational judgment on bail law in democratic South Africa. It comprehensively addresses the constitutional validity of the bail provisions introduced by the 1995 and 1997 amendments to the CPA and provides authoritative guidance on their interpretation and application. Key significance: 1. Clarifies that legislative guidelines for judicial decision-making do not violate separation of powers when they guide rather than dictate outcomes 2. Establishes that the 'interests of justice' test for bail is broader than merely trial-related factors and can include public safety considerations 3. Confirms that even invasive bail restrictions can be justified under section 36 in appropriate circumstances, particularly given South Africa's crime context 4. Resolves uncertainty about the admissibility of bail testimony at trial by adopting a flexible fairness-based approach 5. Establishes that the right to silence is not absolute and informed choices have consequences 6. Provides detailed guidance on how bail hearings should be conducted, particularly for serious Schedule 5 and 6 offences 7. Emphasizes the pro-active, inquisitorial role of judicial officers in bail proceedings 8. Clarifies the limited scope of access to police dockets at the bail stage 9. Balances individual liberty rights against legitimate societal interests in public safety and the integrity of the criminal justice system The judgment had significant practical impact in settling widespread confusion among magistrates, prosecutors and defence attorneys about the application of the new bail provisions in the constitutional era.

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This case references

Cites

  • In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 19961996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC); Case CCT 23/96
  • Lafras Luitingh v Minister of DefenceCase CCT 29/95
  • Nel v Le Roux NO and OthersCCT 30/95 [delivered on 4 April 1996]
  • Harold Bernstein and Others v L. Von Wielligh Bester NO and Others1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); CCT 23/95
  • The State v Wellington Mbatha and The State v Nicolaas Marthinus PrinslooCCT 19/95 and CCT 35/95
  • Shabalala and Five Others v The Attorney-General of the Transvaal; The Commissioner of South African PoliceCCT/23/94; 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC); 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC)
  • Zuma and Two Others v The StateCCT/5/94

Considers

  • Shabalala and Five Others v The Attorney-General of the Transvaal; The Commissioner of South African PoliceCCT/23/94; 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC); 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC)

Follows

  • Zuma and Two Others v The StateCCT/5/94

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  • MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment v HTF Developers (Pty) Limited(CCT 32/07) [2007] ZACC 25
  • African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral Commission and OthersCCT 10/06