Sebola and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and Another

Mr and Mrs Sebola entered into a home loan agreement with Standard Bank in 2007 secured by a mortgage bond over their home. After falling into arrears in 2009, the Bank sent a notice in terms of section 129(1) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 by registered mail to the Sebolas’ chosen postal address. The notice was diverted by the Post Office and never reached them. The Bank thereafter issued summons and obtained default judgment declaring the property executable. The Sebolas only became aware of the judgment after a writ of attachment was issued. They applied for rescission, arguing that the Bank had not complied with section 129 because they never received the notice. The High Court and Full Court dismissed the rescission, relying on the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision in Rossouw, holding that proof of dispatch was sufficient. The Sebolas sought leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional Court. Before the hearing, the Bank abandoned the judgment and withdrew the action, raising mootness.

Leave to appeal was granted. The interpretation adopted by the High Court, Full Court, and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Rossouw was rejected. The Court clarified the correct interpretation of sections 129 and 130 of the National Credit Act. No substantive relief was granted to the Sebolas themselves because the Bank had abandoned the judgment.

This case is a leading Constitutional Court authority on the interpretation of section 129 of the National Credit Act. It strengthened consumer protection by rejecting a purely formalistic approach to notice requirements and emphasised substantive fairness and constitutional values in credit enforcement. The judgment recalibrated the balance between consumers and credit providers and limited the effect of Rossouw, ensuring that consumers are given a real opportunity to access debt relief mechanisms before litigation.