The applicant, Mr Masenyani Thompson Rikhotso, was appointed in 2003 as headman of the Nsavulani ward under the Mahumani Traditional Community, pursuant to nomination by the Mahumani Royal Family and recognition by the Premier of Limpopo in terms of the Limpopo Traditional Leadership and Institutions Act 6 of 2005. Between 2010 and 2011, allegations of serious misconduct relating to his duties as headman were raised. He was charged and invited to attend a disciplinary enquiry but failed to appear on three occasions. In January 2012, the Royal Family resolved to remove him as headman under section 13(1)(d) and (e) of the Act. The Premier subsequently withdrew his certificates of recognition and appointment in March 2013. In September 2017, the applicant instituted review proceedings under PAJA to challenge the Premier’s decision and sought condonation for late filing, which the High Court granted unopposed. However, when deciding the matter, the High Court dismissed the review on the basis of delay/prescription, despite having already granted condonation, and without considering the merits. The applicant unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal in the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, and then approached the Constitutional Court.
The appeal was upheld. The High Court’s order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the High Court for consideration of the merits of the review application. The Premier of Limpopo, the MEC for Cooperative Governance, Human Settlements and Traditional Affairs, and the District Manager of the Mopani Department of Traditional Affairs were ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the applicant’s costs in the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Constitutional Court.
This case affirms the application of the functus officio doctrine in administrative-law litigation and clarifies that once condonation for late review under PAJA is granted, a court cannot later dismiss the matter on the same delay grounds. It reinforces constitutional protections of access to courts and just administrative action, and highlights the cautious approach required when invoking prescription or delay to bar constitutional review proceedings. The judgment is significant for PAJA jurisprudence and for disputes involving traditional leadership recognition and removal.