Zimind Publishers (Pvt) Ltd & Anor v Minister of Local Government, Public Works & National Housing & Ors

The first applicant is a publishing house operating the Zimbabwe Independent newspaper. The second applicant is Transparency International Zimbabwe (TI-Z) Trust, a non-profit organization focused on fighting corruption. In May 2020, the first applicant published news articles alleging corruption in the procurement of 64-seater buses for ZUPCO (third respondent), claiming that a private company called Landela Investments was importing buses at exorbitant prices with involvement of government officials. The applicants sent letters in September 2020 and March 2021 to the first and second respondents (Ministers of Local Government and Finance respectively) requesting detailed information about the bus procurement, citing the Freedom of Information Act and the Constitutional right to access information. The respondents failed to respond within the prescribed timeframes. The applicants sought an order compelling the respondents to supply written reasons for their refusal to provide the requested information. During proceedings, the applicants withdrew their case against the third respondent and effectively abandoned the second applicant's case due to defective authority documentation.

• Whether the applicants had proper authority to bring the application on behalf of the corporate entities
• Whether the second respondent was barred for filing a notice of opposition outside the prescribed timeframe
• Whether the CMED (Central Mechanical Equipment Department) should have been joined as a party
• Whether the applicants failed to exhaust domestic remedies by not appealing to the Zimbabwe Media Commission as provided in the Freedom of Information Act before approaching the court
• Whether the applicants were entitled to written reasons for the respondents' refusal to provide information under the Administrative Justice Act
• The relationship and interaction between the Administrative Justice Act and the Freedom of Information Act

Application granted. The first and second respondents were ordered to supply the first applicant with written reasons for their refusal to provide the requested information within 7 days. The withdrawal against the third respondent was confirmed with the applicants to bear those costs. Costs of the application awarded against the first and second respondents jointly and severally on the ordinary scale (not the attorney-client scale sought).

The binding legal principles established are: (1) An administrative authority's failure to respond to a request for information within prescribed timeframes constitutes administrative action for which written reasons must be provided; (2) The deeming provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (section 10) can be invoked to establish a deemed refusal, which then triggers the obligation under the Administrative Justice Act (section 3) to provide written reasons; (3) Where the specific relief sought is an order compelling the supply of written reasons for refusal (rather than compelling supply of the information itself), the applicant may proceed directly to the High Court under section 6 of the Administrative Justice Act without first exhausting the appeal remedy to the Zimbabwe Media Commission provided in the Freedom of Information Act; (4) The Administrative Justice Act and Freedom of Information Act, being in pari materia, should be construed harmoniously to give effect to both, with each serving different but complementary purposes in vindicating constitutional rights to information and administrative justice; (5) Non-joinder is not fatal where the absent party has no direct interest in the specific relief sought and would not be affected by the order.

The court expressed concern about the sloppy and inelegant preparation of court papers by legal practitioners in what was evidently public interest litigation, particularly regarding basic issues like board resolutions authorizing corporate representatives. Mafusire J noted that "in this day and age no court should still be detained by it" given the abundance of case law on the point. The court also commented that the second applicant's purported board resolution had "all the hallmarks of a simulation" and was "misleading," being dated before the case number existed yet referring to that case number. The court observed, without deciding definitively, that the definition of "information officer" in the Freedom of Information Act appeared wide enough to cover ministers of government as executive heads of entities. The court also noted that inaction (omission) by an administrative authority, such as simply ignoring a request, does not ordinarily give rise to a cause of action under the Administrative Justice Act, which contemplates positive action (commission) - it is the Freedom of Information Act's deeming provision that converts such inaction into actionable conduct.

This case is significant in Zimbabwean administrative law and freedom of information jurisprudence for clarifying the relationship between the Administrative Justice Act and the Freedom of Information Act. It establishes that where an applicant seeks written reasons for refusal to provide information (rather than the information itself), they may approach the High Court directly under the Administrative Justice Act without first exhausting the appeal process to the Zimbabwe Media Commission under the Freedom of Information Act. The judgment recognizes that while both Acts are in pari materia (dealing with related subject matter), they serve different purposes and should be construed to give effect to both. The case also demonstrates judicial willingness to facilitate access to information and transparency in public procurement, particularly where administrative authorities simply ignore requests for information. It affirms that inaction by an information officer can constitute a deemed refusal under the Freedom of Information Act, which can then ground an application for written reasons under the Administrative Justice Act.