Respondent's trucks carrying Rosewood timber loads were detained by the Applicant (Zimbabwe Revenue Authority) at Beitbridge Border Post in January 2022. The Applicant alleged that the trucks had unlawfully bypassed customs clearance procedures at the Chirundu One Stop Border Post on the Zimbabwe-Zambia border, escaping customs control of both Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and ZIMRA. The Zambian Forestry informed ZRA that the vehicles had not complied with Zambian export formalities and had left the Common Control Zone without proper clearance. ZRA sought Applicant's assistance to prevent the vehicles from crossing into South Africa. Respondent made representations for release which were denied. Respondent then filed an urgent chamber application (HC 4496/22) on 8 July 2022 seeking a declaratory order that the detention was unlawful and an order for release of the vehicles. This application was ruled not urgent by Muremba J and struck off the urgent roll on 21 July 2022. Despite this, Respondent set the matter down on the unopposed roll on 15 September 2022 and obtained a default judgment on 21 September 2022 declaring the detention unlawful and ordering release of the vehicles and costs on a legal practitioner-client scale. Applicant became aware of the default judgment on 27 September 2022 and filed an application for rescission of the default judgment on 28 September 2022. Applicant then brought this urgent application for a stay of execution pending determination of the rescission application.
The application for stay of execution was granted. The court ordered a stay of execution of the default judgment granted on 21 September 2022 in case HC 4496/22 pending determination of the Applicant's application for rescission of the default judgment or at the very least pending correction of the judgment in terms of rule 29(i)(a). The order was granted in terms of the provisional order sought.
Where an application for rescission of a default judgment has been filed and demonstrates either prospects of success or good and sufficient cause for setting aside the default order, a stay of execution should ordinarily be granted pending determination of the rescission application. This is necessary to uphold natural justice principles, particularly the audi alteram partem rule, and to prevent the court's judgment from becoming a brutum fulmen. The uncertainty regarding when dies induciae commence to run after an urgent application is struck off and transferred to the ordinary roll under rule 60(19) creates an arguable basis for challenging whether a party was properly in default, which supports granting a stay pending rescission.
The court observed that there is a lacuna in the provisions of rule 60(19) of the High Court Rules 2021 regarding the commencement of time periods after an urgent application is deemed not urgent and transferred to the ordinary roll, though the court noted it was not necessary to determine the correct interpretation as this was a matter for the court hearing the rescission application. The court commented that if courts were to permit the res litigiosa to be disposed of pending determination of rescission applications, parties seeking such redress would justifiably feel aggrieved and become contemptuously dismissive of the court's role in administering justice. The court also noted that the default judgment granted was problematic as it was a hybrid of interim and final relief without evidence that formal amendment had been sought, even assuming the applicant was in default.
This case is significant in Zimbabwean civil procedure for its interpretation of the procedural rules governing the transfer of urgent applications to the ordinary roll after being struck off for lack of urgency. The judgment highlights a lacuna in rule 60(19) of the High Court Rules 2021 regarding when the time period for filing notice of opposition commences after such transfer. The case emphasizes the importance of natural justice principles and the audi alteram partem rule in the context of default judgments and rescission applications. It establishes that courts should be inclined to grant stays of execution pending rescission applications where there are arguable prospects of success, to prevent judgments becoming ineffective (brutum fulmen) and to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The case also demonstrates the risks of parties relying on affidavits filed in prior applications rather than filing proper opposing affidavits that address specific allegations in the matter at hand.