Zimbabwe Homeless People Federation and Others v The City of Harare and Others

The applicants (Zimbabwe Homeless People Federation, an universitas, and two natural persons) sought to set aside a Memorandum of Understanding and Shareholders Agreement concluded between the City of Harare (first respondent) and Augur Investments OU (second respondent) on 21 June 2007 and 4 September 2007 respectively. These agreements created a joint venture company (Sunshine Development (Pvt) Ltd, the seventh respondent) on a 30%-70% shareholding structure. Under the agreements, Augur was to provide USD20-30 million in funding, while the City of Harare would provide land. The applicants alleged that while 99.4197 hectares were to be transferred, more than 239.3823 hectares were actually transferred. They claimed Augur failed to inject the agreed capital and develop the land as intended. The applicants alleged the agreements were concluded without proper authority, violated investment and procurement laws, constituted fraud and were against public policy, and resulted in unjust enrichment. The application was filed in 2021, seeking to declare the agreements null and void and to cancel all title deeds arising therefrom.

• Whether the applicants' claim had prescribed under the Prescription Act [Chapter 8:11]
• Whether the applicants had locus standi (standing) to bring the application
• Whether there were material disputes of fact requiring the matter to proceed by way of action rather than motion proceedings
• Whether a declaratur is subject to prescription
• Whether ratepayers/residents have standing to challenge municipal agreements based on their status as ratepayers

The application was dismissed with costs. All three preliminary objections (prescription, lack of locus standi, and material disputes of fact) were upheld.

1. A claim that seeks not merely a declaratur but also to set aside agreements and cancel title deeds constitutes a 'debt' as defined in the Prescription Act and is subject to the three-year prescription period. 2. Prescription begins to run when the creditor becomes aware of the identity of the debtor and the facts from which the debt arises; constructive knowledge based on public records and involvement in related matters suffices. 3. Locus standi requires a litigant to show direct and substantial interest in the subject matter—a person seeking a declaration of rights must show they are personally adversely affected by the alleged wrong, not merely a remote or contingent interest. 4. Status as a ratepayer or resident of a municipality does not, without more, confer standing to challenge municipal agreements. 5. Serious allegations of fraud, corruption and collusion cannot be determined on motion proceedings where they are disputed—such matters require viva voce evidence and cross-examination of witnesses.

The court observed that if the applicants' approach to locus standi based on ratepayer status were accepted, it would subject all public entities holding assets in trust to endless litigation by anyone who believes assets have not been properly accounted for. This would make judicial work 'not only tedious but also unmanageable as well as untenable' and would stretch the concept of locus 'to meaningless levels.' The court also noted that section 85 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which relates to enforcement of fundamental human rights and freedoms, is not related to the rights mentioned in section 14 of the High Court Act (which deals with declaratory orders). The court commented that the applicant 'cannot be accorded a second bite of the cherry' having chosen to proceed by motion when it should have foreseen that serious allegations would be disputed.

This case is significant for Zimbabwean administrative and civil procedure law as it clarifies important principles regarding: (1) the distinction between pure declaraturs (which do not prescribe) and relief that seeks to alter or reverse accrued rights (which constitutes a 'debt' subject to prescription); (2) the limits of standing for ratepayers/residents to challenge municipal decisions—mere status as a ratepayer does not confer locus standi without showing direct personal adverse effect; (3) the proper procedure for serious allegations of fraud and corruption, which cannot be determined on motion proceedings where facts are disputed; and (4) the application of prescription principles to claims involving municipal land transactions. The judgment reinforces that litigants who choose motion proceedings when facts are likely to be disputed do so at their peril.